Q4: In the real estate project discussed in class, now suppose individual has risk tolerance r1 = $10,000, and individual 2 has risk tolerance r2 = %3D $40,000. (1) What is the optimal risk sharing rule? (2) What are their respective CE? (3) What is the maximal total CE with joint risk tolerance?
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- 2. Suppose you asked the following question to Person A and Person B: "How much are you willing to pay to avoid the following fair gamble – win $100 with 50% chance and lose $100 with 50% chance (thus, Variance is equal to 10,000)?" A's answer- $2 B's answer-$10 Assuming that A and B have CARA utility function, a) compute their absolute risk aversion coefficients (approximately) and b) compute their risk premiums for avoiding the following new gamble - win $500 with 50% chance and lose $500 with 50% chance.Consider the St. Petersburg Paradox problem first discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. The game consists of tossing a coin. The player gets a payoff of 2^n where n is the number of times the coin is tossed to get the first head. So, if the sequence of tosses yields TTTH, you get a payoff of 2^4 this payoff occurs with probability (1/2^4). Compute the expected value of playing this game. Next, assume that utility U is a function of wealth X given by U = X.5 and that X = $1,000,000. In this part of the question, assume that the game ends if the first head has not occurred after 40 tosses of the coin. In that case, the payoff is 240 and the game is over. What is the expected payout of this game? Finally, what is the most you would pay to play the game if you require that your expected utility after playing the game must be equal to your utility before playing the game? Use the Goal Seek function (found in Data, What-If Analysis) in Excel.please solve it in 30 minute please Consider an infinitely repeated game where the stage game is the game of chicken: Swerve Straight Swerve 0,0 -1,1 Straight 1, –1 -10, -10 Assume that the discount factor is very close to one. For concreteness, you can assume that d = 0.99. (a) Is there an SPE in which player l's payoff is 1/(1 – 6)? Explain. (b) Is there an SPE in which each player gets a payoff of 0? Explain. (c) Is there an SPE in which player l's payoff is -2/(1 – 8)? Explain.
- Suppose Xavier has tickets to the Super Bowl, but is terribly ill with a noncontagious infection. How would a decision maker perform his economic calculation on whether to attend the game, based on the traditional model of risk behavior?Consider a game with two players (Alice and Bob) and payoffffs Bob Bob s1 s2 Alice, s1 3, 3 0, 0 Alice, s2 0, 0 2, 2 In the equilibrium in the above game, Alice should (A) always choose the fifirst strategy s1; (B) choose the fifirst strategy s1 with probability 40% ; (C) choose the fifirst strategy s1 with probability 50% ; (D) choose the fifirst strategy s1 with probability 60% .Say there are two individuals; Hala and Anna who are deciding on either to buy health insurance on a pooling arrangement basis or otherwise. Both face a 30% probability of losing RM40 on medical services and 70% of losing nothing. With these information discuss whether Hala and Anna should join this arrangement or pay the medical services costs out of their own pocket money.
- 1. Mr. Smith can cause an accident, which entails a monetary loss of $1000 to Ms. Adams. The likelihood of the accident depends on the precaution decisions by both individuals. Specifically, each individual can choose either "low" or "high" precaution, with the low precaution requiring no cost and the high precaution requiring the effort cost of $200 to the individual who chooses the high precaution. The following table describes the probability of an accident for each combination of the precaution choices by the two individuals. Adams chooses low precaution Adams chooses high precaution Smith chooses low precaution Smith chooses high precaution 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.1 1) What is the socially efficient outcome? For each of the following tort rules, (i) construct a table describing the individuals' payoffs under different precaution pairs and (ii) find the equilibrium precaution choices by the individuals. 2) a) No liability b) Strict liability (with full compensation) c) Negligence rule (with…First Player can invest $1.00 with Second Player (low reliance) or $2.00 (high reliance). Based on the payoffs shown below, what is the probability of performance that makes High Reliance optimal? Write your answer as a two digit integer. E.g., if the answer is 33%, write 33. Second Player Perform Breach Invest & Low Reliance 0.25 1.0 First Player 0.25 -1.0 Invest & High Reliance 0.5 1.0 0.75 -2.02. Consider the following Bayesian game with two players. Both players move simultaneously and player 1 can choose either H or L, while player 2's options are G, M, and D. With probability 1/2 the payoffs are given by "Game 1" : GMD H 1,2 1,0 1,3 L 2,4 0,0 0,5 and with probability 1/2 the payoffs are according to "Game 2" : G |M|D H 1,2 1,3 1,0 L 2,4 0,5 0,0 (a) Find the Nash Equilibria when neither player knows which game is actually played. (b) Assume now that player 2 knows which one among the two games is actually being played. Check that the game has a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
- (ii) A mixed strategy profile (p, q) is one in which p = (p,P2.... P) is the mixed strategy of player 1, and q- (g1, q2,..q4) is the mixed strategy of player 2. Show that if p, >0 in a Nash equilibrium profile (p*, q*), the player 2 must also play i with strictly positive probability q'; > 0. (State clearly any theorem you use to show this. You are not required to justify the theorem.) %3DFor questions 32 - 35 consider the following "research and development" game. Firms A and B are contemplating whether or not to invest in R8D. Each has two options: "Invest" and "Abstain." A firm that invests will invent product X with a probability of 0.5, whereas a firm that abstains is incapable of invention. Investment costs $6. If a firm doesn't invent X. it makes 50 in revenue. If a firm invests and is the only one to invent X. it becomes a monopolist and generates $20 in revenue. If both firms invent X, each firm becomes a duopolist, and generates $8 in revenue. Revenues are gross figures (i.e. they are not net of investment costs), and there are no costs besides investments costs (i.e. no variable cost of production etc.). The firms are risk-neutral entities, and are uninformed of each other's investment decisions. Find the Nash Equilibrium (or Equilibria) of the "research and development" game. There are no Nash Equilibria Invest/Invest Invest/Abstain, and Abstain/Invests…For questions 32 - 35 consider the following "research and development" game. Firms A and B are contemplating whether or not to invest in R8D. Each has two options: "Invest" and "Abstain." A firm that invests will invent product X with a probability of 0.5, whereas a firm that abstains is incapable of invention. Investment costs $6. If a firm doesn't invent X. it makes 50 in revenue. If a firm invests and is the only one to invent X. it becomes a monopolist and generates $20 in revenue. If both firms invent X, each firm becomes a duopolist, and generates $8 in revenue. Revenues are gross figures (i.e. they are not net of investment costs), and there are no costs besides investments costs (i.e. no variable cost of production etc.). The firms are risk-neutral entities, and are uninformed of each other's investment decisions. Find the Nash Equilibrium (or Equilibria) of the "research and development" game. A. There are no Nash Equilibria B. Invest/Invest C. Invest/Abstain, and…