Statistics for Business and Economics
8th Edition
ISBN: 9780132745659
Author: Paul Newbold, William Carlson, Betty Thorne
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 3.3, Problem 47E
To determine
Probability of the success in at least one task.
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A manufacturer of high-tech computing equipment must decide whether or not to
continue development of a new promising technology. continuing the development would
cost $2 Million. If the development is continued, then a patent is either awarded or not.
70% chance that the patent will be awarded and
The best estimate is that there is a
a 30% chance that it will not.
if the patent is awarded, the company needs to decide whether or not to license the
technology. it does, it would receive a total of $25 million in licensing royalties.
However, the
company
could also produce and sell the technology in-house (at. a cost of
$10 million), in which case there is an additional uncertainty about the demand for the
technology. if the demand is high (p = 0.25), the company would make $55 Million in
revenues, if the demand is medium (p = 0.55) the company would make $33 Million and if
the demand is Low (p = 0.20) the company would still make $15 Million.
a) Draw and solve a decision tree…
Halsen, a marketing manager at Business X, has determined four possible strategies (X1, X2, X3, and X4) for promoting the Product X in London. She also knows that major competitor Product Y has 4 competitive actions (Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4) it’s using to promote its product in London, too. Ms. Halsen has no previous knowledge that would allow her to determine probabilities of success of any of the four strategies. She formulates the matrix below to show the various Business X strategies and the resulting profit, depending on the competitive action used by Business Y. Determine which strategy Ms. Halsen should select using. Maximax, maximin or minimax regret?
Business X Strategy Business Y Strategy
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
X1
25
57
21
26
X2
17
29
20
34
X3
47
31
32
37
X4
35
27
30
35
n people guess an integer between 1 and 100, and the winner is the player whose guess is closest to the mean of the guesses + 1 (ties broken randomly). Which of the following is an equilibrium:
a) All announce 1.
b) All announce 50.
c) All announce 75.
d) All announce 100
Chapter 3 Solutions
Statistics for Business and Economics
Ch. 3.1 - Prob. 1ECh. 3.1 - Prob. 2ECh. 3.1 - Prob. 3ECh. 3.1 - Prob. 4ECh. 3.1 - Prob. 5ECh. 3.1 - Prob. 6ECh. 3.1 - Prob. 7ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 8ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 9ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 10E
Ch. 3.2 - Prob. 11ECh. 3.2 - In a city of 180,000 people there are 20,000 legal...Ch. 3.2 - Prob. 13ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 14ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 15ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 16ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 17ECh. 3.2 - Prob. 18ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 19ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 20ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 21ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 22ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 23ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 24ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 25ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 26ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 27ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 28ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 29ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 30ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 31ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 32ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 33ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 34ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 35ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 36ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 37ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 38ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 39ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 40ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 41ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 42ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 43ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 44ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 45ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 46ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 47ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 48ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 49ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 50ECh. 3.3 - Prob. 51ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 52ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 53ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 54ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 55ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 56ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 57ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 58ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 59ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 60ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 61ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 62ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 63ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 64ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 65ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 66ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 67ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 68ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 69ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 70ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 71ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 72ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 73ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 74ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 75ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 76ECh. 3.4 - Prob. 77ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 78ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 79ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 80ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 81ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 82ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 83ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 84ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 85ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 86ECh. 3.5 - Prob. 87ECh. 3 - Prob. 88ECh. 3 - Prob. 89ECh. 3 - Prob. 90ECh. 3 - Prob. 91ECh. 3 - Prob. 92ECh. 3 - Prob. 93ECh. 3 - Prob. 94ECh. 3 - Prob. 95ECh. 3 - Prob. 96ECh. 3 - Prob. 97ECh. 3 - Prob. 98ECh. 3 - Prob. 99ECh. 3 - Prob. 100ECh. 3 - Prob. 101ECh. 3 - Prob. 102ECh. 3 - Prob. 103ECh. 3 - Prob. 104ECh. 3 - Prob. 105ECh. 3 - Prob. 106ECh. 3 - Prob. 107ECh. 3 - Prob. 108ECh. 3 - Prob. 109ECh. 3 - Prob. 110ECh. 3 - Prob. 111ECh. 3 - Prob. 112ECh. 3 - Prob. 113ECh. 3 - Prob. 114ECh. 3 - Prob. 115ECh. 3 - Prob. 116ECh. 3 - Prob. 117ECh. 3 - Prob. 118ECh. 3 - Prob. 119ECh. 3 - Prob. 120ECh. 3 - Prob. 121ECh. 3 - Prob. 122E
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