Leadership Failures in Black Hearts by Jim Frederick Essay

This cause the men to get a lot less time to relax, taking 8 or more hour guard shifts. The redundant, mundane task of manning the TCPs would make the soldiers restless, tired and complacent; an extremely dangerous combination when in a combat zone. The TCPs would cause a lot of problems throughout the entire deployment. The first catastrophe to hit Bravo Company, and 1st platoon in particular, was the deaths of SSG Nelson and SGT Casica from 3rd SQD. They were both shot point blank while trying to talk to a familiar civilian that they had spoken to previously while manning a TCP. This was the start of the downward spiral that 1st platoon went through during the deployment. Continuing after this incident, the company was still spread very thin, having too many tasks and not enough people. Having to go out on a 20-hour mission and then have to go back out right after you get to the FOB hoping for a bit of relaxing time was a serious moral killer. This didn’t not help the fact that 1st platoon already had been taking out bottled anger and remorse for their lost comrades out on insurgent and civilian alike. To them they were all the enemy. The next big blow the 1st platoon was the deaths of 1LT Britt and SPC Lopez. During a routine IED sweep of route sportster, 1LT Britt and his men were taking contact from mortar fire and one remotely launched RPG from across the canal the paralleled the road. Once the fire had stopped 1LT Britt

The book Black Hearts opened my eyes to how leadership from a single Officer can have a grappling effect on such a wide range of soldiers from the lowest of ranks. One of the best takeaways from Black Hearts is to never do anything: illegal, unethical, or immoral. Although this is a easy statement to repeat, Black Hearts demonstrates the difficulties that lie behind these words. It has also painted a picture of how leadership can topple extremely quickly from a top down view. The Army is portrayed in a bad light throughout the book relentlessly. This is due to the concentration of poor leadership of the 1-502nd Regiment (Referred to as “First Strike”), a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division.

The 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) has a proud history of accomplishments. It has served in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Historically, the morale across the brigade was high; leaders took care of their Soldiers, and all of them did their best to train them, accomplish missions successfully, and support them in any way. The 4th ABCT HQ, as well as each of the battalions, were highly efficient and effective, and most of them were jubilant to be part of the brigade. Three years ago, one of the best maneuver brigades in FORSCOM was the 4th ABCT. The brigade had focus; leaders and soldiers were dedicated, and there was a strong work ethics. However, the 4th is facing some challenges ahead that are going to make difficult to reach its full potential. Amongst several leadership problems, there is a major one. There is not an organizational vision in the brigade, and if there is, it is unclear and poorly evident.

This unit was practicing improper procedures for their soldiers were drinking, doing drugs, and visiting local brothels. From a tactical stand point the 48th infantry was no better in this aspect either. The patrols they conducted were inadequate and performed far from often. The area supposed to be under their control became dangerous because the insurgents moving in the area were virtually unchallenged. This was no feat for the 101st and 1st platoon because the 101st is a tactically sound unit that could establish control and a presence in the area but for soldiers that had to do so upon arrival when it was supposed to be maintained is not necessarily a good thing. The company commander of bravo, Cpt. Goodwin decided the best way to take back control of their area of operations is to have a three station cycle for his company. Each platoon would have a twenty-one day rotation at a different location carrying out a different task. The three tasks were to set up TCP on a main roads, set up a FOB and be the quick reaction force for the other platoons, and the third task was to patrol the city as per guidance from higher. The least liked job was manning the TCP’s. The soldiers did not like this job because they knew soldiers sitting in the open made for easy targets. The task of patrolling was no easy feat either, as stated earlier the previous unit left the city in poor conditions. The roads were filled with

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

Arriving in October 2005, the entire campaign units were struggling throughout with being over-tasked and under-staffed, and 1st platoon was a major victim of this occurrence. Relieving the 48th Infantry Brigade, who had no relations with the locals and very little presence in the AO, they had to reestablish control of the area around FOB Yusufiyah. With terrible living conditions and little to no equipment, the platoon had to juggle improving their fighting positions while at the same time secure the JSB and the AVLB. The company TOC had no kitchen to cook food nor any running water. Soldiers would fill sand bags from sun up to sun down trying to provide themselves with some sort of cover against attacks. The PSG Miller would request supplies constantly, but it seemed a low priority of the the higher command. This was a common theme throughout the time they were in the triangle of death. It wasn't often that officers would visit the FOB or provide supplies to enhance their situation, but when they did it was not a welcomed response. Kunk would come by and tell the soldiers how undisciplined and how little work they had completed with little consideration of how hard the soldiers had been working with the limited resources.

I began this book like most books, with great anticipation that it was going to be amazing, why else would a qualified instructor assign it. I assumed that it would be a shining example of the finest managerial principals in existence all compacted into a simple to read text with plenty of graphs and helpful handouts. I was certain that I would be a more effective leader for having read it. I spent time strategizing how I would write my paper with great enthusiasm. Then, I read the book.

The next part of the book detailed a very sharp decline in the morale and unit cohesion of Bravo Company, but primarily first platoon. The death of Nelson and Casica was the first. Nelson and Casica died when a shooter opened fire on a TCP with a 9mm at

A perfect example of this type of conflict that can arise between these types of leadership comes from the novel A Lesson Before Dying by Ernest J. Gaines when analyzing the conflict between two prominent characters in Grant Wiggins and Reverend Ambrose. Just as I considered Pope Francis to be the antithesis of President Trump, I also believe that Reverend Ambrose is the antithesis of Grant Wiggins. However, there is one significant difference when comparing these two relationships. Unlike President Trump, who I consider to be a poor moral leader, I believe that Grant Wiggins is a good moral leader and it makes this comparison even more intriguing to me. In addition, Grant also considers himself an Atheist, while President Trump does not.

From the battalion level to the company level the leadership from the top started to makes its way the individual squad members. As 1st platoon continue to have their struggles with the leadership they begin to also have them with the battlefield. The constant stress from the leadership began to build up and continued to build up with the environment they were set in. A lot of the company commanders became passive leader not knowing what to or did not want to do anything that would get on LTC Kunk’s bad side. CPT good did show signs of stress in some of his decision making one in particular cost him the lives of his men. The platoon leader of first platoon LT Britt was an enthusiastic leader who everyone in his platoon respected but later feared for his life before dying to IED. The platoon sergeant seemed to take everything well even with the lack of sleep and supply. The squad leaders

1-502nd deployed to Iraq in October of 2005. LTC Kunk split his forces into 3 elements. Kunk gave his toughest missions to Bravo and Charlie companies. Their AO and FOB was away from the rest of the BN and violence was considered the worse in this area. Once the orders were received by the company commanders, each company pushed out to their respective FOBs. It did not take long for Bravo Company to start taking casualties. 1st PLT was being hit particularly hard. One of the first things Bravo Company did was set up TCPs in designated areas within and on the outskirts of the town. These were stationary targets that insurgents picked up on quickly. They attacked the TCPs frequently and the TCPs were normally guarded by a minimal amount of soldiers. IEDs were also affecting Bravo’s combat strength within the AO.

The events that led up to the rape and murder of a teenaged Iraqi girl and murder of her family directly resulted in the committing of the atrocity itself. Leading soldiers is not an easy, quick, or part-time job. From reading this book, I have gleaned that the issue wasn’t one of sub-par soldiers, but of poor leadership straight up the chain of command and I interpret the source of the problem to be the Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Kunk. Admittedly there were leadership failures from Gen. Petraeous all the way down to the team leader level, however, I believe most of the problems originated at the platoon level due to a general lack of support from the battalion level. This review will hit on main events in during the deployment but

Maj. Gen. “Fighting Joe” Hooker demonstrated an excellent example of failed mission command during the Battle of Chancellorsville in April 1863. He had thought he would defeat General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia by maneuver beginning in Chancellorsville as he pushed Lee toward Richmond. His commitment toward his own plan for Lee’s response would overshadow his operational planning and ultimately lead to a mission command failure at Chancellorsville despite outnumbering Lee’s troops 128,000 to 60,000. Through decentralized execution, Hooker could have empowered agile and adaptive leadership to operate under uncertainty, exploit opportunities, and achieve unity of effort. Instead, he failed in exercising at least four principles of mission command. He did not provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, or accept prudent risk.

As they began to clear the routes in the AO the casualties starting occurring. After some time had passed all the platoons had experienced many deaths and were starting to lose a lot of their platoon leadership. The mounting pressure of combat combined with the pressure coming down from LTC Kunk communication between the company and battalion level leadership began to digress. With morale lowering with every day and casualty that went by the men began to run the tactical checkpoints that they had set up ruthlessly. They weren’t treating civilian harshly and would even harass them physically. This gave them a notorious record among the Iraqi civilians. Going into December 2005 the men had begun to relax on their own standard operating procedures along the

In the opening of this paper the below description of the need for strategic leadership and the difficulty in defining it can both be seen. In Becoming a Strategic Leader: Your Role in Your Organization 's Enduring Success by Richard L. Hughes and Katherine Colarelli Beatty define this difficulty beautifully in their opening. The book opens with a description of the difficulty of learning to surf. As you stand looking at the beautiful ocean, you move to begin paddling out through the waves only to fail each time at getting up and successfully riding a wave all the way to shore. It speaks of trying and practicing at home, only to be thrown when the "moment ' counts. The imagery of attempting to learn to surf and failing due to a lack of