Introduction
Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their
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LTC Kunk’s mission was twofold. His BN was to deploy to a region in the Euphrates valley that was south of Baghdad, dubbed the “Triangle of Death”. An American presence had only lightly occupied the area and the insurgency in that region was multiplying. They were unleashing havoc on American troops in the area as well as civilians. 1-502nd was also tasked with training a division within the Iraqi Army in the hope that they would secure the area once American troops departed for good. 1-502nd deployed to Iraq in October of 2005. LTC Kunk split his forces into 3 elements. Kunk gave his toughest missions to Bravo and Charlie companies. Their AO and FOB was away from the rest of the BN and violence was considered the worse in this area. Once the orders were received by the company commanders, each company pushed out to their respective FOBs. It did not take long for Bravo Company to start taking casualties. 1st PLT was being hit particularly hard. One of the first things Bravo Company did was set up TCPs in designated areas within and on the outskirts of the town. These were stationary targets that insurgents picked up on quickly. They attacked the TCPs frequently and the TCPs were normally guarded by a minimal amount of soldiers. IEDs were also affecting Bravo’s combat strength within the AO. It did not take long for morale to drop, especially in 1st PLT. Within the first 4 months of the deployment, 1st PLT had lost their PL and PSG as well as a few “Joes” to IEDs
In this world, there is no individual more tragic than the one who gazes into their future and is only able to see a perpetual cycle of despair and agony. War, in particular, has this incomprehensibly dark power—the ability to drive even the most cheerful among us into the oppressive void of depression. Indeed, the total and complete loss of hope is among the most destructive consequences of war on the human psyche. An expression of this phenomenon is visible in Paul Baumer’s statement regarding the true psychological state of soldiers. When reflecting upon the experience of being in the military, Baumer says “We are little flames poorly sheltered by frail walls against the storm of dissolution and madness, in which we flicker and sometimes almost go out...Our only comfort is the steady breathing of our comrades asleep, and thus we
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
Colonel (Col) Michael Steele’s resolute beliefs regarding how to prepare his unit for combat and his bravado demeanor commanded respect from other bemused military officers. While serving as Commanding Officer (CO), 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Col Steele aggressively cultivated a command climate focused on three core principles: personal protection, precision, and lethality. Although these three core principles narrowly aligned with the Army's "Soldier's Creed", Col Steele’s principles did not reinforce the Army’s individual and organizational core values. 3rd Brigade’s disassociated ethical subculture fostered a toxic environment which compromised both subordinate commanders' and individual soldiers' moral standards to various extents. Col Steele’s vague guidance concerning proper ethical behavior during the execution of high stress Counter-Insurgency (COIN) missions resulted in subordinates failing to conduct kinetic operations in accordance with established Army ethical standards. The military establishment shall remember May 09, 2006 as the day the revered "Rakkasans" failed to personify the unit's motto of "Ne Desit Virtus," meaning "Let Valor Not Fail". For on this day, four soldiers assigned to Charlie Company, known to the “Rakkasans” as the "Kill Company", murdered eight unarmed Iraqi citizens during Operation Iron Triangle. These four soldiers failed to understand the nature and consequences of their iniquities as they could no longer distinguish
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the real world consequences of when Army leaders become complacent dealing with foreign national soldiers, and the day to day operations while in a combat theatre. To gather lessons learned from the example discussed in order to lower the probability of a reoccurrence among the force. Through the example demonstrate the need for Army leaders to constantly fight against complacency, and the extreme importance that leaders know their soldiers, and place their soldiers’ needs before their own. The scenario discussed was a real incident that took place in Iraq in 2009, at a Coalition Outpost (COP) approximately 30 kilometers south of Mosul, in a city called Hammam al-Alil.
It was in this environment that Kunk started belittling and micromanaging his company commanders and sowed the seeds of mistrust between the different companies and the headquarters unit. In defense of Kunk, the mission he received was going to be one of the most difficult missions during the Iraq war. Upon reaching their area of operations and conducting their battle hand-off, the problems already started to arise with Bravo Company. A majority of their leadership was wounded or killed in action, creating a power vacuum and a domino effect which were exacerbated by Kunk’s actions. Instead of providing support to his wounded company, Kunk belittled them and blamed them for the hardships that had befallen their comrades further driving a wedge of mistrust between Bravo Company and the head quarter’s element. Even with frequent changes in leadership, the casualties and problems continued to rise for Bravo Company, and living conditions for the soldiers reached deplorable levels. Being short-manned stretched the already limited resources causing personnel levels to be recklessly low for the various tasks the company received. This lack of men and lack of leadership cultivated the perfect environment for heinous criminals to act on their impulses. Company commanders complained, psychiatric evaluations were completed, recommendations were made that went unheeded and problems still
This experience, above all other wartime horrors, changed the writer-to-be’s perspective on warfare and the human condition that causes it.
The novel War, written by Sebastian Junger, records the events in Korengal, Afghanistan with the American Army from a journal’s perspective. Throughout the book, he retells his experiences of fire fights, the emotional trauma of losing a fellow fighter, the undeniably strong bond between soldiers, and the consequences combat has on family members. While this novel has some detailed and brutally honest components regarding the war in Afghanistan, I found the insight provided by Junger on combat to be interesting. Once I started reading this novel, putting down the book was nearly impossible as I was finding myself entranced within this world of war. The insight into the world of combat, although brief, permitted me to better understand a soldier’s experience in war zones. My previous knowledge regarding the novel’s context, as well as personal experiences, transformed my mindset from thinking critically about the novel to becoming emotionally connected to the soldiers’ success. I found that the more I read this novel, the more my life experiences influenced my attitude towards the individuals and experiences as described by Junger.
When young Smithson had joined the Army reserves at just age 17, he encounters many feelings such as abandonment, the innocence of Iraqi citizens and death. When touring Iraq, Smithson experiences many horrific events including the death of a fellow soldier, which he did not know very well. When hearing
There has always been a disconnect between civilians and military personnel which can be on account to the violence experienced during war. In the first short story “ Redeployment” the soldier discusses his disgust about having done horrendous things during war such as “shooting dogs” and seeing “the body parts in the locker and the retarded guy in the cage” while in the torture room (Klay 2). Having participated and saw these ghastly events it makes it difficult for soldiers in some aspects to listen to civilian commands after having being deployed “And the planes captain, a fucking civilian, reads off some message about how general orders stay in effect until you reach the states… So no alcohol” this leads to the corporal jumping up and saying, “ You’ve got three hours. I hear they serve Guinness” (Klay 4).
Enemy combatants, in familiar terrain, chose to stand and fight from fortified positions; forcing commanders to improvise and adapt quickly to unforeseen circumstances. Support elements received the operational order within just one week of the expected execution date. Staff elements created analysis and plans on poor intelligence estimates and recent experience. Strategic planners also failed to establish command and control of the assault force. Lack of forethought for an integrated joint operation, although ultimately successful, led to the death of U.S. service members. Joint planning for Operation Anaconda, with its complex variables requiring integrated skills, failed to account for enemy variables, withheld information from support elements, and failed to establish effective command and control.
A soldier with extreme mental anguish was starting to be understood of not as a coward or “feeble willed”, but as a casualty. Additionally, the motivations behind joining this conflict were more traditionally respectable than in previous American-involved conflicts. Troops were not jumping into France or landing on Guadalcanal for the sake of “American business interests”. It is far easier to support liberating death camps or avenging an attack on American soil than “making the world safe for democracy”. Regardless of Dalton Trumbo’s cynicism, American’s still recognized the merit in protecting other’s right to life and
LTC Bailey advocated the nexus of intelligence driven operations and successfully achieved the 1st Iraqi FPD collaboration of the Intelligence and Operations Officer resulting in two high value enemy targets captured. LTC Bailey conducted over 100 combat patrols with partnered Iraqi forces in a heavy green on blue threat
There was TF 11, TF Dagger, TAF K-bar, TF Blue, TF Red and TF Rakkasan, just to name a few; these were units headquartered in different geographic areas, answering to different commanders and overall commands, made up of conventional infantry forces, aviation forces, allied foreign forces, indigenous forces, white special operations forces and black special operations forces. Though many of the officers had served with each other in various capacities (especially within the 75th Ranger Regiment) there was still friction between many of the Task Forces. With this many variabilities in commands and organization important resources and pieces of intelligence were bound to slip through the cracks; and they did. One important instance being the failure of communication between CFLCC and CAOC regarding what Army forces were expecting in terms of close air support (CAS). In the words of one pilot “Those guys are having rock drills at Bagram, we, the guys who are going to fly the missions in support of it, aren’t part of it. What the fuck? Over.”3 Additionally no one from the SOF units attended final rehearsals by the conventional rehearsals or visa versa. This lack of communication led to a lack of unity of effort between the two groups; neither group fully understood what the other expected from them. Later in the battle, during the handoff between TF-11 forces and TF Blue forces, there was a severe lapse in communication. TF Blue forces were communicating almost solely on their own communication net, leaving out nearly all other forces from their planning and execution process. This resulted in the plan to helicopter a team to establish an OP directly on the summit of Takur Ghar, a plan unbeknownst to the TF-11 headquarters, who knew of enemy
Several weeks later, Task Force Regulars commenced Operation Regular Ripper, the last major combat operation of the deployment. The main focus of the operation was to secure the Old Baqubah neighborhood and provide momentum for the unit that would assume control of eastern Baqubah as the Battalion readied for redeployment. The operations brought many improvements in infrastructure and security for the people of Old Baqubah and kept the enemy on the run.
War is hell. War is misery, suffering, pain, and anguish. From the days of rocks and sticks to today’s high tech drones and aircraft carriers one thing above all others has remained the same; war is a terrifying, nightmarish endeavor. Unfortunately for those who fight for their nation, the battlefield does not remain in the far off land where the battle took place. In fact, those warriors bring back that battlefield, festering in the hearts and minds, sometimes long after their uniforms have been put in the closet to collect dust. It should come as no surprise that for a variety of reasons all stemming from combat experience, many of our nations Veterans will act in unconventional or perhaps even illegal ways, in an attempt to cope with