Examples Of Failed Mission Command In The Battle Of Chancellorsville

General George Armstrong Custer has been touted as one of the most infamous Army leaders in American military history. Often he is used as a cliché to indicate a great failure of a process or military action. But what did Custer do to bring about his demise on the hot afternoon of Sunday June 25th, 1876? Why did his successes in the Civil War not follow him into the Indian Wars? The purpose of this paper is to explore the principals of mission command and to describe how Custer embraced or violated them.

“Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units.” During the battle, McClellan personally “directed the actions of his generals from his headquarters, two and one-half miles from the front lines, visiting the field only once.” McClellan issued orders to his generals through couriers and flag signals; in addition, kept apprised of the action by telescope even though parts of the battle were not visible. This distancing potentially clouded his judgment, reducing his ability to achieve success. Since McClellan did not consult with his generals about his operations process, due to the lack of trust, there was no coordination between the McClellan’s adjacent

The Army of the Potomac was the largest Union Army in the Civil War, and it fought in many important battles (“Army Of The Potomac”). The Confederate cavalry was said to have given three options when being faced- run, surrender, or die. The Federal cavalry knew they had to improve their unequipped and unorganized fighting force if they were ever going to get a chance to claim victory. Hooker’s ultimate goal was to crush Robert E. Lee in battle, so he took the cavalry, reformed it, and made it a new force of over 2,000 men, which “acted as a single body” ("The Battle of Kelly's Ford Summary & Facts"). This was the largest cavalry force to be put together by a lone commander up to that point. Control of this force was given to Averell. With this new army, they would have a chance to change the course of the war in their favor. After the renovation, Hooker wanted a place to test his new brigade and turn the tables on the Confederates, so he chose Fitzhugh Lee’s fort at Kelly's’ Ford on the Rappahannock River. He figured he could show the Confederates how good the Unions can be if they are organized. Now that the battle was set in place, the real course-changing fight could

General Jackson’s II Corps attacked during the afternoon of May 2nd. Opposing them was a Union force that had gathered for supper and was wholly unprepared to defend itself. Union forces rapidly withered and routed under the Confederate onslaught, retreating within hundreds of meters of General Hooker’s headquarters. Within several hours of the initial attack, nightfall forced a halt to the Confederate offensive and offered a reprieve for Union forces. Determined to prevent the Union Army from regrouping and consolidating its lines during the night, General Jackson conducted a reconnaissance of Union lines with key members of his staff, in preparation for a night attack. While returning from the evening reconnaissance, Confederate soldiers from North Carolina misidentified Jackson and his staff and fired upon them, wounding Jackson and several other staff officers. Upon learning of Jackson’s condition, General Stuart immediately assumed command of II Corps.

Mission command philosophy, as defined by United States Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, plays a critical role in the effective leadership of Soldiers and the accomplishment of the mission. While not always referred to as “mission command,” the principles of mission command remain unchanged despite the passage of time. For example, these principles held true over two hundred years ago during the Battle of Tippecanoe. This battle, between forces of the United States (US) and Native Americans, illustrates how employment of mission command principles can influence the outcome of a conflict. Specifically, President William Henry Harrison, the governor of Indiana Territory at the time,

an instance of such a figure of speech or a use of words exemplifying it.The battle of Chancellorsville occurred in late April and early May of 1863. Lincoln, disappointed in General Ambrose Burnside’s performance at the head of the Army of the Potomac, appointed Major Joseph Hooker general not too long before the battle. The Confederate force was garrisoned near the Rappahannock River in Spotsylvania County, Virginia. General Hooker’s force forded the river and proceeded towards the intersection at Chancellorsville, but were caught up in the thick Virginian bush. Instead of retreating from the slowly approaching formidable force, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson sat down and devised a plan to capitalize off the hindered Hooker. Stonewall

The Battle of Chancellorsville began on April 30, 1863 in the rural Spotsylvania County, Virginia and ended 6 days later on May 6, 1863. The battle was a result of the Union trying to take control of the Confederate capital, Richmond, Virginia. The Union had four previous attempts with the same objective, but they were defeated every time. The Union’s energy was low, so General Joseph Hooker stepped in for Major General Ambrose Burnside. He planned to restore the troop’s morale and improve the soldier’s efficiency. He fixed problems such as, the living conditions of the troops, the food

The Battle of Chancellorsville, one of the most famous battles of the Civil War, took place in Virginia in the spring of 1863. For months, the two armies had been staked out on opposite banks of a narrow river. The Confederate troops were led by perhaps the most revered military tactician in American history, General Robert E. Lee. The Union soldiers were led by "Fighting" Joe Hooker. In appearance, personality, and lifestyle, these men were nearly perfect opposites. Lee, an older man in poor health with a gray beard, had a somber, measured demeanor. Hooker was a blond, strapping young man whose vanity over his appearance was but one aspect of his egotism. Hooker had used spies, analysts, and even hot air balloons to compile a vast amount

In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison, Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an excuse to get rid of him, immediately accepted. They replaced Hooker early on the morning of June 28 with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, then commander of the V Corps.

If the pontoon bridges needed by the Union Army had arrived on time maybe that would have altered the course of the battle. General Lee would not have had the time to dig in on the high ground surround Fredericksburg. The battle would have played out differently in that scenario. Or, If General Lee had seen the number of Union Troops around Falmouth maybe he would have decided that Fredericksburg was indefensible, using only delaying tactics against the Union forces, while continuing with his plan of stopping the Union Army further south along the more defensible North Anna River, but closer to Richmond. The other option from MG Hooker was to have crossed the Rappahannock River upstream or further downstream. The upstream option would have been better courses of action for that time of year, but a longer trip to Richmond.

After his victory at the Battle of Chancellorsville, Virginia, in May 1863, Robert E. led his Army of Northern Virginia into its second invasion of the North. Lee planned to accrue supplies in the prosperous Pennsylvania farmland, and take the fighting away from a war-torn Virginia. He wanted to bring the war to Northern cities so they could experience the war first hand. the hope behind this reasoning is that he could weaken the North's desire for war; thus, strengthening the North`s desire for peace. Urged by President Abraham Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker moved his Union Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Lee`s army, but Hooker was relieved of command just three days before the battle. Hooker's successor, Maj. Gen. George Meade moved northward, keeping his army between Lee`s and Washington, D.C. When Lee learned that Meade was in Pennsylvania, he concerted his confederate army around the city of Gettysburg.

Though after finding Hooker had acted without orders Lincoln fired him. Lee discovered Hooker was in pursuit through a spy, Harrison on June 28, 1863. Hooker was fired only 3 days before the battle took place. He was replaced with General Meade. Who moved North towards Pennsylvania, keeping his troops between Lee and the Union capital. The two troops met and fought just Northwest of the town of Gettysburg. This would be where the real bloodshed would take place, thankfully it wouldn’t be as bad as Antietam.

Robert E. Lee lost in Antietam, which lowered chances of convincing Great Britain to develop the diplomatic region. Lee then decided to devise a plan that would scare the north. Lee’s campaign was working well, until Hooker was duplicating his tactics.

As a primary tenet of Mission Command, understanding allows the field commander to assess what is happening on the battlefield and make rapid decisions on the best way to carry out the commander’s intent. Without clear and concise guidance on objectives, opportunities to exploit advantages as they arose were lost and significant time was wasted reorienting forces to adhere to guidance that was not current based on conditions. Both General’s Eisenhower and Alexander failed to identify the objectives and

This paper examines poor intelligence utilization and how General (GEN) Robert E. Lee’s decision to realign his Army after the death of his strongest General influenced Confederate tactical operations. The Civil War was a crucial and poignant period in our country’s history. Leadership on both sides were pivotal to the triumph of the Union and the crumble of the Confederacy. The Battle of Gettysburg was a turning point for the Union and highlighted the weaknesses within Confederate intelligence capabilities. On July 1, 1863, GEN Lee’s Confederate Army initiated its second assault in Northern territory against the Union Army. GEN Lee’s Commanders were unable to accurately shape the battlefield in their favor due to a lack of intelligence officers