2. Consider the following 3-player game where each player has 3 strategies. Player 1 decides up, middle, or down (U, M, D). Player 2 simultaneously decides whether to go left, center, or right (L, C, R). Player 3 decides whether to move forward, backward, or stay put (F, B, S). Using the payoffs shown below, find all Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. U M D L 2, 1, 3 3,2,2 2, 1, 1 C 2, 2, 2 3, 1, 2 1, 2, 3 F R 2, 1, 3 4, 2,5 4, 1, 3 TEKSANDRA L 3,3,4 1, 3, 2 9, 1, 1 C 4, 1, 1 4, 2, 2 2, 1, 1 B R 6, 2, 3 4, 1, 5 3, 0, 3 L 4, 2, 2 2, 1, 1 3, 4, 5 C 2, 1, 3 1, 1, 1 3, 7, 1 S R 3, 3, 3 3, 4, 1 4,4,3

2. Consider the following 3-player game where each player has 3 strategies. Player 1 decides up, middle, or down (U, M, D). Player 2 simultaneously decides whether to go left, center, or right (L, C, R). Player 3 decides whether to move forward, backward, or stay put (F, B, S). Using the payoffs shown below, find all Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. U M D L 2, 1, 3 3,2,2 2, 1, 1 C 2, 2, 2 3, 1, 2 1, 2, 3 F R 2, 1, 3 4, 2,5 4, 1, 3 TEKSANDRA L 3,3,4 1, 3, 2 9, 1, 1 C 4, 1, 1 4, 2, 2 2, 1, 1 B R 6, 2, 3 4, 1, 5 3, 0, 3 L 4, 2, 2 2, 1, 1 3, 4, 5 C 2, 1, 3 1, 1, 1 3, 7, 1 S R 3, 3, 3 3, 4, 1 4,4,3

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2MC

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