(Scheduling Competition by Broadcasting Stations) Consider the broadcasting news scheduling model with four broadcasting stations labeled A, B, C and D. There are n viewers whose ideal watching time is 20:00, and n viewers whose ideal watching time is 21:00. Let t; denote the broadcasting time of station i. (i = A, B, C, D) Assume that each station can air its news broadcast at one and only one time period. Also assume that each station earns exactly $1 per viewer (as determined by rating surveys conducted during the broadcasting hours). (a) List all the Nash equilibria in broadcasting time. (You do NOT have to provide a proof). (b) Now assume that there are n viewers whose ideal watching time is 20:00, and 5n viewers whose ideal watching time is 21:00. Find all Nash equilibria and provide a formal proof.

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4. (Scheduling Competition by Broadcasting Stations) Consider the broadcasting news
scheduling model with four broadcasting stations labeled A, B, C and D. There are n
viewers whose ideal watching time is 20:00, and n viewers whose ideal watching
time is 21:00. Let t; denote the broadcasting time of station i. (i= A,B, C, D) Assume
that each station can air its news broadcast at one and only one time period. Also
assume that each station earns exactly $1 per viewer (as determined by rating
surveys conducted during the broadcasting hours).
(a) List all the Nash equilibria in broadcasting time. (You do NOT have to provide a
proof).
(b) Now assume that there are n viewers whose ideal watching time is 20:00, and 57
viewers whose ideal watching time is 21:00. Find all Nash equilibria and provide a
formal proof.
Transcribed Image Text:4. (Scheduling Competition by Broadcasting Stations) Consider the broadcasting news scheduling model with four broadcasting stations labeled A, B, C and D. There are n viewers whose ideal watching time is 20:00, and n viewers whose ideal watching time is 21:00. Let t; denote the broadcasting time of station i. (i= A,B, C, D) Assume that each station can air its news broadcast at one and only one time period. Also assume that each station earns exactly $1 per viewer (as determined by rating surveys conducted during the broadcasting hours). (a) List all the Nash equilibria in broadcasting time. (You do NOT have to provide a proof). (b) Now assume that there are n viewers whose ideal watching time is 20:00, and 57 viewers whose ideal watching time is 21:00. Find all Nash equilibria and provide a formal proof.
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