Assume that there are two parties, I and V.  I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents.  Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25.  If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18.  Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents.  If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes.  Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard.  That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V.  If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game under a rule of no liability?   Question…

Some community rating regulations in the health insurance market require insurance companies to charge everyone the same premium (with slight adjustments for age and gender), regardless of a person's health status (e.g. if they smoke or have a preexisting condition). Cancelling this regulation would people would be. likely to buy adverse selection because, premiums insurance when offered increase; healthy; less; lower. decrease; sick; more; higher. increase; healthy; more; higher. decrease; healthy; more; lower

5. Shift-in-charge Nazar Al Rushdy: Nazar is pessimistic about the market price. What is your guidance for Nazar? The decision to employ decision trees in crucial situations has been taken by Salem Al Harthi, the plant manager. The table below presents data on demand for a duration of 6 hours along with their respective probabilities. The first row of the table provides the probability of demand for the initial three hours when a leak occurs, denoted in parentheses. Subsequently, the following three rows indicate the probabilities of high, medium, and low demand for the succeeding three hours. To illustrate, if the initial 3-hour market price was low, the probabilities of high demand, medium demand, and low demand in the next three hours are 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5, respectively. Market price High Market price Medium Initial 3-hrs (0.2) Initial 3-hrs (0.5) Market price Low Initial 3-hrs (0.3) High demand (next (0.5) (0.4) (0.2) 3 hrs) Medium demand (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (next 3 hours) Low demand…

#3. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). If Hannah doesn't visit her family for Thanksgiving, then she gets -25 utils from eating turkey cold cuts alone in front of the TV. In that case, there is no risk of getting sick. What will Hannah do? a. Visit her family for Thanksgiving b. Not visit her family for Thanksgiving c. Visit her family if she is risk-loving, not visit if she is risk-averse d. Visit her family if she is risk-averse, not visit if she is risk-loving

#3. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). If Hannah doesn't visit her family for Thanksgiving, then she gets -25 utils from eating turkey cold cuts alone in front of the TV. In that case, there is no risk of getting sick. What will Hannah do?

Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages.   What is the Nash equilibrium of this…

Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages.   Under a negligence standard, what are…

Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages.   Under a negligence standard, what are…

Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages.   Under a negligence standard, what is…