Microeconomics
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259915727
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 4.A, Problem 3ADQ
To determine
Moral hazard problems and adverse selection problems.
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53. The Indiana University basketball team trails by twopoints with eight seconds to go and has the ball. Shouldit attempt a two-point shot or a three-point shot?Assume that the Indiana shot will end the game and thatno foul will occur on the shot. Assume that a three-pointshot has a 30% chance of success, and atwo-point shot has a 55% chance of success. Finally,assume that Indiana has a 55% chance of winning inovertime.
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1.Adam and Zoey are competing fish and chips sellers in Linear City. They are located at the twoopposing ends of the town’s 3-mile-long Main Street. The 1700 inhabitants of the town are distributeduniformly on Main Street and each of them eats at most one portion of fish and chips for lunch. People’sdisutility from getting to a fish and chips stand and back home amounts to $2 for each mile of distanceto the stand. The marginal cost of producing one portion of fish and chips is $9. The consumers areuniformly distributed along the street. Each consumer has a valuation of $29.0 for the product. Supposethat both Zoey and Adam can advertise at zero cost to inform everyone about their business. Find theequilibrium price of Zoey if neither of the two sellers advertises.
If a risk‐averse individual owns a home worth $100,000, and that individual iswilling to pay a maximum of $1,000 for an annual fire insurance policy that covers theentire loss in the event of a fire, then we know that:A. There is a one percent chance that the home will be destroyed by fire inthe next yearB. There is a greater than a one percent chance that the home will bedestroyed by fire in the next yearC. There is less than a one percent chance that the home will be destroyedby fire in the next yearD. None of the above is correct
Chapter 4 Solutions
Microeconomics
Ch. 4.A - Prob. 1ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1APCh. 4 - Prob. 1DQCh. 4 - Prob. 2DQCh. 4 - Prob. 3DQ
Ch. 4 - Prob. 4DQCh. 4 - Prob. 5DQCh. 4 - Prob. 6DQCh. 4 - Prob. 7DQCh. 4 - Prob. 8DQCh. 4 - Prob. 9DQCh. 4 - Prob. 1RQCh. 4 - Prob. 2RQCh. 4 - Prob. 3RQCh. 4 - Prob. 4RQCh. 4 - Prob. 5RQCh. 4 - Prob. 6RQCh. 4 - Prob. 7RQCh. 4 - Prob. 1PCh. 4 - Prob. 2PCh. 4 - Prob. 3PCh. 4 - Prob. 4PCh. 4 - Prob. 5PCh. 4 - Prob. 6PCh. 4 - Prob. 7P
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