a)
To calculate:
The long-run equilibrium output and the selling price for each firm.
a)
Answer to Problem 1E
The long-run equilibrium output for firm Cis175 and for firm D is 150 and the selling price for each firm
Explanation of Solution
Profit for firm C
The cost function for firm C
Profit function is,
Differentiating the total profit function and equating it with zero:
Profit for the firm D is,
The cost function of the firm D is,
Profit function is,
Differentiating the total profit function with respect to the
Simultaneously by equating (2) and (3) ,
By substituting the value of
Substituting the output values of both firms:
Introduction:
The long-run self-adjustment mechanism is one process that can bring the economy back to “normal” after a shock. The idea behind this assumption is that an economy will self-correct; shocks matter in the short run, but not the long run.
b)
To calculate:
The total profits for each firm at the equilibrium output
b)
Answer to Problem 1E
The total profits for firm D and C at the equilibrium output is
Explanation of Solution
The profit function of firm C is,
Substituting the value of output of both firms in above equation,
The profit function of firm D is,
Substituting the value of output of both firms in profit function:
Introduction: The long-run self-adjustment mechanism is one process that can bring the economy back to “normal” after a shock. The idea behind this assumption is that an economy will self-correct; shocks matter in the short run, but not the long run.
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Chapter 12 Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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- Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning