What is the economic mechanism assuring that the consensus mechanism works so that all miners would find it optimal to add a valid block in their own copy of the blockchain? a. The system automatically updates the ledger b. Adding a valid block candidate in their blockchain is a dominant strategy for all participants in the network c. The communication among miners and the idea that such a strategy is a Nash equilibrium assure it d. The consensus mechanism works because of cryptography and does not have any economics behind

What is the economic mechanism assuring that the consensus mechanism works so that all miners would find it optimal to add a valid block in their own copy of the blockchain? a. The system automatically updates the ledger b. Adding a valid block candidate in their blockchain is a dominant strategy for all participants in the network c. The communication among miners and the idea that such a strategy is a Nash equilibrium assure it d. The consensus mechanism works because of cryptography and does not have any economics behind

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

4 Problem: Ticket Exchange Each of two players draw a lottery ticket with a random prize written on it. You can assume that prizes a uniformly drawn from an interval between 0 and 100 (can you solve it without uniform assumption?). Both player simultaneously decide whether to keep the prize or exchange the ticket with another player. If both decide to exchange, then the tickets are swapped and each player collects a prize from the newly acquired ticket. Find the BNE of the game. Hint: consider cut-off strategies, i.e. that prizes above some x are kept, and below z are offered for exchange.
i am not sure how to ask anther question after the expert answered one of mine but here is a question i asked the expert and the naswer he game me in picture 1 & 2. the questions insnt linked from other sites its from bartleby just coudlnt see option to ask anther. can you answer this part now: Now assume the financial advisor knows that another advisor will offer a competitive portfolio. Based on historical data, he knows this competitive portfolio’s total return follows a normal distribution with mean £36mil and standard deviation of £2mil and is priced at 5% of total return. Clients will naturally choose the advisor which offers the portfolio with the highest net How does the distribution of profit over the range of financial prices considered in part B) changes, when the competitor is considered?
12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?
** Please be advsed that this is practice only from previous yeasr *** Answers: (a) There are no Nash equilibria.(b) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and no mixed strategy Nash equilibria.(c) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 1/2.(d) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 3/4.(e) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 3/4 and q = 1/2.
4. Consider the following model of a bank run. Depositors may either Hold or Withdraw their funds from a bank. Both players hold deposits of 6, which earn interest of 1 if kept in the bank. If either depositor withdraws then the bank fails. If both try to withdraw then each depositor can only recover half of their deposits. The payoffs for a two-player version of this game are given below: Player 2 Player 1 Hold Withdraw Hold 7,7 6,0 Withdraw 0,6 3,3
4. Consider the following model of a bank run. Depositors may either Hold or Withdraw their funds from a bank. Both players hold deposits of 6, which earn interest of 1 if kept in the bank. If either depositor withdraws then the bank fails. If both try to withdraw then each depositor can only recover half of their deposits. The payoffs for a two-player version of this game are given below: Player 1 Hold Withdraw Hold 7,7 6,0 Player 2 Withdraw 0,6 3,3 (a) Find any pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (b) Find any mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (c) How do the concepts of 'payoff dominance' and 'risk dominance' apply in this context? Do they help us to predict which equilibrium is more likely to occur? (d) Suppose we now make this game sequential so that Player 2 moves first. Player 1 observes Player 2's action and moves second. What are the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria of this new game? (e) Give one example of how the players or a…
Two firms, A and B, are each considering trying to develop a newwidget. Whichever firm is first to develop the new widget wins a patent worth $20 million plus a penny.Developing a new widget involves several ‘steps’. The firms alternate moves, with A moving first, until oneof them wins the patent. All moves are observed. In each turn, a firm can choose whether to take 0, 1, or2 development ‘steps’. Taking 0 steps in a turn costs that firm $0. Taking 1 step in a turn costs $4 million.And taking 2 steps in a turn costs $11 million. For simplicity, assume a zero discount rate. Initially, eachfirm is 4 steps away from completing development.(a) Describe and explain carefully what will happen in this patent race and why. [Hint: it may help toread Dutta ch 12 (but notice I changed the numbers).](b) Very briefly explain what is the economic rationale for granting ‘intellectual property rights’ such aspatents. What are some disadvantages for society of granting such rights?
1. The table below shows expected payoffs (in $billions) for GM and the United Auto Workers (UAW) as they enter contract negotiations. Strike GM UAW Concede Bargain Hard -20, -10 10, -15 Concede -10, -2 15, 0 a. Using game theory for a one-shot, simultaneous decision game, find all the Nash equilibria. b. Each side enters negotiations threatening to take a hard line (Bargain Hard or Strike). How credible are each of these threats and why (briefly)?
6. Consider the following two-player game: 2 L M U 3,3 2,3 1 M 2,1 3,1 D R 0,2 3,3 0,3 3,0-5, -5 a. Find all pure NE. b. Find a (non-pure) MNE in which player 1 (the row player) plays a pure strategy. c. (Harder Question) Show that there cannot be a CE prescribing that strat- egy D of player 1 (the column player) is played with positive probability.
1\2 U D L 4,3 0,0 R 0,0 2,1 C 1,4 0,0 Q. Suppose players 1 and 2 play the stage game depicted above. Check whether each of these strategies constitute a SPE? 1. Play U,C in Rounds 1 and 2 2. Play D,R in rounds 1 and 2 each 3. Play U,L in Round 1 followed by U,C in Round 2. If Player 2 defects punish by playing D,R in round 2. 4. Alternate between U,C and D,R in Rounds 1 and 2
Suppose that a large discount retailer with a lot of purchasingpower in a supply chain requires that all suppliers incorpo-rate a new information system that will reduce the cost of placing orders between the retailer and its suppliers as wellas between the suppliers and their suppliers. Suppose alsothat order quantities and lead times are related; the smallerthe order quantity the shorter the lead time from suppliers.Assume that all members of the supply chain use a continu-ous review system and EOQ order quantities. Explain the im-plications of the new information system for the supply chainin general and the inventory systems of the supply chainmembers in particular
don't answer by pen paper and don't use chatgpt otherwise we will give dounvote Answer both others wise give dounvote 48. There are 5 firms with sales of firm1=$19.0million, firm2=$11.0million, firm3=$6.0 million, and the remaining two firms have $4.0 million each. Firm1 and Firm2 wish to merge. What is the new Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI)? 34. There are 19.6 firms in a market with sales, Firm 1=$ 18.5, Firm 2= $14.1, Firm 3=$ 8.0, Firm 4= $11.1, Residual firms = $1.0 each, Find the numbers equivalent of firms