Suppose that the stage game below is infinitely repeated and the players have a common discount factor 8. Using grim trigger/Nash reversion strategies, for what values of 8 can (C, C) each period be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium? 2 C D C 3,3 -2,9 D 9,-2 1, 1 1

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.6P
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Suppose that the stage game below is infinitely repeated and the players have a
common discount factor 8. Using grim trigger/Nash reversion strategies, for what
values of 8 can (C, C) each period be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium?
2
C
D
C 3,3
-2,9
D 9,-2
1, 1
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Transcribed Image Text:Suppose that the stage game below is infinitely repeated and the players have a common discount factor 8. Using grim trigger/Nash reversion strategies, for what values of 8 can (C, C) each period be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium? 2 C D C 3,3 -2,9 D 9,-2 1, 1 Choose a File 1 Upload
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