Company Market Share Toshiba 10% Dell 10% HP 15% Sony 10% Refer to the table above, which details laptop firms' market shares. Based on the Herfindahl Index (HHI) for the laptop market would the Justice Department allow a merger between Sony and Dell? Yes, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger O No, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger Yes, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger and the HHI increases by more than 100 more than 100 No, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger and the HHI increases

Company Market Share Toshiba 10% Dell 10% HP 15% Sony 10% Refer to the table above, which details laptop firms' market shares. Based on the Herfindahl Index (HHI) for the laptop market would the Justice Department allow a merger between Sony and Dell? Yes, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger O No, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger Yes, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger and the HHI increases by more than 100 more than 100 No, because the HHI was below 1800 before the merger and the HHI increases

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter16: Government Regulation

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

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Use the following table to calculate the Herfindal-Hirshman Index for the U.S. auto market. Would the FTC approve a merger between Gm and Ford? Explain your response. The table is......... GM 19% Ford 17% Toyota 14% Chrysler 11%
PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 MC = ATC MR 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810 900 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome $0.80 per can. Given this When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce 180 cans and charge information, each firm earns a daily profit of $144.00, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $288.00. Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Stargell decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Stargell's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to now $ , while Schmidt's…
New Tab https://assets.open... Home-Oxnard Uni... Please, look at the graph below. What is the profit-maximizing price this monopolist will charge for their newest product? $2,000 Check-In C Sign in to My CLIC... 51.800 $1,600 Dollars $1,400 $1,200 $1,000 5800 $600 $400 $200 50 O $600 O $400 O $800 O $1200 96 5 2.5M 9 * ASMA Quantity 3413 2-3573 MR 2 /мс SOD AC Demand PreCalculus Expe
The table below shows revenue data for different firms producing frying pans. Use the given information to find the market share and squared value of the market share for each firm. Round each market share value before further calculations (no decimals). Firm - Acme Co Baluga, LLC Corky Co Dingo Inc Echo Co Fox Inc Revenue in $ 170.00 230.00 270.00 250.00 210.00 250.00 Market Share What is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) for this market? A A - - A Market share squared ← A A A A
3. Based on the best available econometric estimates, the market elasticity of demandfor your firm’s product is -2. The marginal cost of producing your product is constant at $50. a. What is your optimal per unit price if you are a monopolist?b. What is your optimal per unit price if you compete against one other firm in a Cournotoligopoly? What is your optimal per unit price if you compete against 20 other firms in aCournot oligopoly?c. What price pattern are you seeing between parts a and b? Explain why this makes intuitivesense (hint: at what price will you eventually sell your product if the number of firmscontinues to increase?).d. Suppose once again you are a monopolist, but your product sells to two different groups ofconsumers segmented by region. The east coast customers have demand elasticity equal towhat is shown above (-2) and your west coast customers have demand elasticity equal to -4.Determine the optimal prices under third-degree price discrimination. What conditions…
Question 16 Monopolistic Competition -- Questions 16-20 refer to Figure 6-2 below. This figure depicts a situation in a monopolistically competitive market. Figure 6-2 105 100- MC 95 90+ ATC 70 65 60 55 30 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10+ MR Demand +++ s 10 is 20 25 30 35 40 4s s0 ss 60 6s 70 7s so as 90 95 10010s1101is120 Refer to Figure 6-2. What quantity will the monopolistically competitive firm charge in this market?
ne Semester 2023 dules nouncements NWP Assessment Play X signments scussions yllabus Grades Zoom People Turnitin https://calstatela.instructure.com/courses/85933/quizzes/382812/take Oligopoly Oaksville has two tennis instructors, Sam and Jack. The figure shows the demand curve and marginal revenue for tennis lesson appointments and the average total cost. Price and cost (dollars per appointment) Microsoft Office 365 Google Apps Type here to search X F1 @ 2 21 A- F2 A+ F3 Quiz: Homework 7 #3 X F4 BI $ 4 70 60 50 40 30 23 10 ☀ - F5 0 X % 5 2 Alt Text: pink glitter ro X Alt Text: appointments Competitive Outcome, (Pcomp, Qcomp) ☀+ F6 6 MR 8 F7 6 4 10 Quantity (appointments per hour) L yu F8 8 & 7 O MC D ATC F9 Negative Manuscript X * 00 8 F10 ( 9 n F11 ) 0 Oracle Peopl 59°F Mostly clouc ☆ A to F12 Hom
Let's assume that the biggest two firms in the video game sector merged and that the market share of the new firm representing the two merged firms is equal to 39% of the market. Let's assume that after merger HHI of the video game industry is 2071. Based on the Federal Trade Commission's historical standards for mergers, would the Federal Trade Commission certify this merger? No, the FTC would probably challenge the merger. No answer text provided. Maybe. The FTC would scrutinize the merger and make a case-by-case decision. Yes, the FTC would ignore the merger and allow it to go through.
6. Under what conditions might the Justice Department approve a merger between two companies that operate in an industry with a premerger Herfindahl- Hirschman index of 2,900 if the postmerger index is expected to increase by 225?
Homework. The inverse demand curve a monopoly faces is p= 110 – Q. The firm's cost curve is C(Q) = 30 + 5Q. What is the profit-maximizing solution? The profit-maximizing quantity is (Round your answer to two decimal places.) The profit-maximizing price is $ (round your answer to two decimal places.) DEC 13 MacBc esc 80 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 #3 2$ 1 2 3 Q W < CO -
PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 + 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 MC=ATC MR 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge $ so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to $ while McCovey's profit is now $ Mays increases…
The table shows the total revenue of the 50 firms in the roofing industry. Total revenue Calculate the four-firm concentration ratio and the HHI. Firm (dollars) >>> Answer to 2 decimal places. Roofmart 740 Shingles R Us Weather Guard 400 What is the market structure of the roofing industry? 300 Dry on Top Next 10 firms (each) Next 16 firms (each) 100 The four-firm concentration ratio equals 90 60 The HHI equals Next 20 firms (each) 50 The four-firm concentration ratio indicates that the market is Industry 4,400 and the - (Assume there are no reasons that would make the concentration measures unreliable Herfindahl-Hirschman Index indicates that the market is guides.) O A. a monopoly; a monopoly O B. monopolistic competition; monopolistic competition OC. probably not monopolistic competition; monopolistic competition D. mononolistic competition: a mononolv