Show that the following is possible: two bidders in a combinatorial auction are given no goods by the VCG mechanism if they bid truthfully, yet both can achieve positive utility if they both submit suitable false bids. Can this ever happen in the Vickrey auction?

Exploring Economics
8th Edition
ISBN:9781544336329
Author:Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:Robert L. Sexton
Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior
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Show that the following is possible: two bidders in a combinatorial auction are given
8.
no goods by the VCG mechanism if they bid truthfully, yet both can achieve positive utility if
they both submit suitable false bids.
Can this ever happen in the Vickrey auction?
Transcribed Image Text:Show that the following is possible: two bidders in a combinatorial auction are given 8. no goods by the VCG mechanism if they bid truthfully, yet both can achieve positive utility if they both submit suitable false bids. Can this ever happen in the Vickrey auction?
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