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Suppose that firm A and firm B repeatedly face the situation presented in the table below, and the interest rate is 40 percent. The firms agree to charge a high price each period, provided neither firm has cheated on this agreement in the past.
|
Fir |
m B |
|
|
Firm A |
Price |
|
Low |
High |
Low |
|
0, 0 |
50; -40 |
|
High |
|
-40, 50 |
10; 10 |
- What are firm’s A profits if it cheats on the collusive agreement?
- What are A’s profits if it does not cheat on the collusive agreement?
Does equilibrium result where the firms charge the high price each period?
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- Suppose firm A and firm B repeatedly face the situation presented in Table and the interest rate is 40 percent. The firms agree to charge a high price each period, provided neither firm has cheated on this agreement in the past. 1. What are firm A’s profits if it cheats on the collusive agreement? 2. What are firm A’s profits if it does not cheat on the collusive agreement? 3. Does an equilibrium result where the firms charge the high price each period?. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose there are only two firms that sell tablets: Padmania and Capturesque. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its tablets. Capturesque Pricing High Low Padmania Pricing High 9, 9 3, 15 Low 15, 3 7, 7 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Padmania prices low and Capturesque prices high, Padmania will earn a profit of $15 million, and Capturesque will earn a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Padmania and Capturesque are both profit-maximizing firms. If Padmania prices high, Capturesque will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Padmania prices low, Capturesque will make more profit if it chooses a price. If Capturesque prices high, Padmania will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Capturesque prices low, Padmania…high low high 11, 11 2,18 low 18, 2 10,10 Suppose there are only two firms that sell tablets: Padmania and Capturesque. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its tablets. For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Padmania prices low and Capturesque prices high, Padmania will earn a profit of $18 million, and Capturesque will earn a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Padmania and Capturesque are both profit-maximizing firms. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? 1. Padmania will choose a low price, and Capturesque will choose a high price. 2. Both Padmania and Capturesque will choose a high price. 3. Padmania will choose a high price, and Capturesque will choose a low price. 4. Both Padmania and Capturesque will choose a low price. True or False: The…
- Smith Cable, Inc. and Jones Glass Fibre Works are the two largest suppliers of a specialty fiber-optic cable used by NASA and military defense contractors. On the first day of every month, both companies post on the Internet a list of prices for their various fiber-optic cable products-either high prices or low prices. The following payoff table provides the monthly profits for Smith and Jones: Jones Glass Fibre Works High prices Low prices A C Smith Cable, Inc. High prices $7, S4 B D Low prices $2, $5.5 $8, S1 $4, $2 Payoffs in dollars of monthly profit (a) Suppose the pricing decision is made sequentially. Using the payoff table, complete the two sequential game trees. In the first game tree, let Smith Cable, Inc. make the first pricing decision. In the second game tree, let Jones Glass Fibre Works go first. After you complete the two game trees, solve both sequential decision games using the roll-back method. Circle the solution path on each game tree. (b) Do Smith Cable, Inc. and…Save Answer Consider two cigarette companies, PM Inc. and Brown Inc. If neither company advertises, the two companies spit the market and earn $60 million each. If they both advertise, they again split the market, but profits are lower by $20 million since each company must bear the cost of advertisirlg. Yet if one company advertises while the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. In this case, the company that advertises earns $70 million while the company that does not advertise earns only $30 million. What will these two companies do if they behave as individual profit maximizers? Neither company will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $60. One company will advertise, the other will not. Brown Inc. earns $70. Both companies will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $40. Both companies will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $60.Refer to the table below to answer the following questions. Table 14.2.10 Fim A Comply A: Sim Cheat A $1 Sm Comply B Sim B-S05m Firm B A:-50.5m A0 Cheat B $15m B:0 Refer to Table 14.2.10. Firm A and Firm B are the only producers of soap powder. They collude and agree to share the market equally. The equilibrium a dominant strategy equilibrium because the strategy in this game is for a firm Select one O A is to comply regardless of the other firm's choice O B.is to comply when the other firm cheats and to cheat when the other firm complies O Cis not to comply when the other firm complies and to cheat when the other firm cheats OD. is to cheat regardless of the other firm's choice OEis not to comply when the other firm cheats and to cheat when the other firm complies 219 PM
- II.2 Companies A and B can compete on advertising or R&D. The profits (in millions of $ million) of the two firms are given in the table below assumig that they play a one-shot simultancous mov game (the profit or firm A is listed first in every cell of the matrix, followed by the profit of firm B): Advertising R&D 50, 25 10, 70 20, 40 60, 35 1. Find the mixed strategy equilibrium. A\B Advertising R&D 2. What are the expected profits for both firms in this equilibrium?2 clothing manufacturers, LE and LL B, are deciding what price to charge for very similar field coats. Cost of producing these coats is $100. The coats are very close substitutes, so customers swarm to the seller that offers the lowest price. If both firms offer the same prices, each receives half of the customers. Assume the two firms have the choice of pricing at prices of $103, $102, or $101. The profit each firm would earn at various prices is shown in the payoff matrix below $103 ($150, $150) ($0, $200) ($0, $120) Lands' End $102 ($200, $0) ($100, $100) ($0, $120) $101. ($120, $0) ($120, $0) ($50, $50) What is the Nash equilibrium and expected profits to LLB and LE of this game? If this was a mixed strategy game in which LLB has a 25% percent chance of choosing a price of $101, a 25% chance of choosing price of $102, and a 50% chance of choosing $103, while LE has a1/3 chance of…Consider a two-player game between Child's Play and Kid's Corner, each of which produces and sells swing sets for children. Each player can set either a high or a low price for a standard two-swing, one-slide set. If they both set a high price, each receives profits of $64,000 per year. If one sets a low price and the other sets a high price, the low-price firm earns profits of $72,000 per year, while the high-price firm earns $20,000. If they both set a low price, each receives profits of $57,000. Assume also that the annual discount rate is r = 25%, or 8 = 0.8. The price-setting game in each year could be represented in the following normal form: CP (row)/ KC (column) High Price Low Price Game between CP and KC High Price 64, 64 72, 20 Low Price 20, 72 57, 57 a) What is the stage equilibrium of the prisoners' dilemma between CP and KC? i.(L,H) ii. (H,L) iii. (L,L) iiii. (H,H) b) What is the cooperative strategy profile? i.(L,H) ii. (H,L) iii. (L,L) iiii. (H,H) c) Suppose we repeated…
- Suppose that GE is trying to prevent Maytag from entering the market for high efficiency clothes dryers. Even though high efficiency dryers are more costly to produce, they are also more profitable as they command sufficiently higher prices from consumers. The following payoffs table shows the annual profits for GE and Maytag for the advertising spending and entry decisions that they are facing. GE MAYTAG Advertising = $12m Advertising = $0.7m Stay Out $0, $30m $0, $35m Enter $1m , $20m $12m, $15 Based on this information, can GE successfully prevent Maytag from entering this market by increasing its advertising levels? What is the equilibrium outcome in this game? Suppose that an analyst at GE is convinced that just a little bit more advertising by GE, say another $2m, would be sufficient to deter enough customers from buying Maytag, thus, yield less than $0 profits for Maytag in the event it enters. Suppose that spending an extra $2m on advertising…Suppose that the pricing strategies for FiberOne and of Starlink are shown in the table below. They have to decide whether to charge a high or low price for their internet service. The four pairs of payoff values show what each company expects to earn or lose in millions of dollars, depending on what the other company does.FiberOne’s Price StrategyStarlink’s Price StrategyHigh Price Low PriceHigh Price Starlink+$200 FiberOne +$200 Starlink+$500 FiberOne - $100Low Price Starlink-$100 FiberOne + 500 Starlink+$100 FiberOne +$100If it’s expected that the incomes of people living in rural Nigeria is expected to increase, what will the equilibrium outcome be, ceteris paribus?a) a) Starlink will charge a low price; FiberOne will charge a high price.b) b) Starlink will charge a high price; FiberOne will charge a low price.c) c) Both Starlink and FiberOne will charge a low price.d) d) Both Starlink and FiberOne will charge a high price.Pictech Pricing High Low High 8, 8 4, 13 Flashfone Pricing Low 13, 4 7,7 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses price. price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price. a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech. Considering all of the information given, pricing low If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price. O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price. O Both…