Pictech PricingHighLowHigh8, 84, 13Flashfone PricingLow13, 47,7For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech willearn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms.If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses av price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it choosesprice.price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it choosesIf Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses aprice.a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech.Considering all of the information given, pricing lowIf the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price.O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a low price.O Flashfone will choose a low price, and Pictech will choose a high price. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price.O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a low price.O Flashfone will choose a low price, and Pictech will choose a high price.True or False: The game between Flashfone and Pictech is not an example of the prisoners' dilemma.TrueO False

The game theory is the investigation of the manners by which communicating decisions of monetary…

For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses price. If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses price. Considering all of the information given, pricing low v a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.

For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses price. If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses price. Considering all of the information given, pricing low v a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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