Firms 1 and 2 are proposing to merge. They offer symmetrically differentiated products and have identical costs and, therefore, identical premerger prices. (Note that “symmetrically differentiated products” means that if they charge the same price, then they have the same demand.) The common premerger price for firms 1 and 2 is $90, and the common marginal cost is $60. If firm 1 were to raise its price to $100, we know that its demand would drop by 20 units and firm 2’s demand would rise by 5 units. a. Assume the merger would reduce marginal cost by 10 percent. Using UPP, is there reason to be concerned with the merger? b. Suppose the prospective merger partners want to convince the DOJ that the merger will not raise price. Using UPP, how large must they argue the efficiency is? c. Suppose there are improved estimates of firms’ demand functions and now we know that if firm 1 were to raise its price to $100, its demand would (still) drop by 20 units, but firm 2’s demand would rise by 10 units. Are unilateral effects stronger or weaker with this new demand estimate? Is the merger more or less likely to be approved?

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)
9th Edition
ISBN:9781305260948
Author:Irvin B. Tucker
Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker
Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 20SQ
icon
Related questions
Question

9. Firms 1 and 2 are proposing to merge. They offer symmetrically differentiated products and have identical costs and, therefore, identical premerger prices. (Note that “symmetrically differentiated products” means that if they charge the same price, then they have the same demand.) The common premerger price for firms 1 and 2 is $90, and the common marginal cost is $60. If firm 1 were to raise its price to $100, we know that its demand would drop by 20 units and firm 2’s demand would rise by 5 units.

a. Assume the merger would reduce marginal cost by 10 percent. Using UPP, is there reason to be concerned with the merger?

b. Suppose the prospective merger partners want to convince the DOJ that the merger will not raise price. Using UPP, how large must they argue the efficiency is?

c. Suppose there are improved estimates of firms’ demand functions and now we know that if firm 1 were to raise its price to $100, its demand would (still) drop by 20 units, but firm 2’s demand would rise by 10 units. Are unilateral effects stronger or weaker with this new demand estimate? Is the merger more or less likely to be approved?

Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 5 steps with 3 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Payoff Matrix
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305260948
Author:
Irvin B. Tucker
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Survey Of Economics
Survey Of Economics
Economics
ISBN:
9781337111522
Author:
Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:
Cengage,
Micro Economics For Today
Micro Economics For Today
Economics
ISBN:
9781337613064
Author:
Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:
Cengage,