(Figure: Payoff Matrix for the United States and Canada) Use Figure: Payoff Matrix for the United States and Canada. Suppose that the United States and Canada both produce quinoa, and each country can earn more profit if output is limited and the price of quinca is high. The dominant strategy for the United States is: Canada US Low output High output Low output EU profit $10 million US profit $10 million EU profit $4 million US profit $12 million High output EU profit $12 million US profit $4 million o low output The United States does not have a dominant strategy O adopt a fit for tal strategy O high output EU profit $7 million US profit $7 million

(Figure: Payoff Matrix for the United States and Canada) Use Figure: Payoff Matrix for the United States and Canada. Suppose that the United States and Canada both produce quinoa, and each country can earn more profit if output is limited and the price of quinca is high. The dominant strategy for the United States is: Canada US Low output High output Low output EU profit $10 million US profit $10 million EU profit $4 million US profit $12 million High output EU profit $12 million US profit $4 million o low output The United States does not have a dominant strategy O adopt a fit for tal strategy O high output EU profit $7 million US profit $7 million

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20P: May and Raj me the only two growers who provide organically grown corn to a local grocery store....

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Consider trade relations between the United States and Mexico. Assume that the leaders of the two countries believe the payoffs to alternative trade policies are as follows a. What is the dominant strategy for the United States? For Mexico? Explain. b. Define Nash equilibrium. What is the Nash equilibrium for trade policy? c. In 1993, the U.S.Congress ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement, in which the United States and Mexico agreed to reduce trade barriers simultaneously. Do the perceived payoffs shown here justify this approach to trade policy? Explain. d. Based on your understanding of the gains from trade (discussed in Chapters 3 and 9), do you think that these payoffs actually reflect a nation's welfare under the four possible outcomes?
Suppose OPEC has only two producers, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, Saudi Arabia has far more oil reserves and is the lower-cost producer compared to Nigeria. The payoff matrix in the table to the right shows the profits earned per day by each country. "Low output" corresponds to producing the OPEC assigned quota and "high output" corresponds to producing the maximum capacity beyond the assigned quota Which of the following statements is true? OA. The Nash equilibrium is a cooperative equilibrium. OB. The Nash equilibrium is a noncooperative, dominant strategy equilibrium OC. The Nash equilibrium is a collusive equilibrium. D. There is no Nash equilibrium in this game because each party. pursues its dominant strategy. Low output Nigeria High output Low output Nigeria earns $20 million Saudi Arabia Nigeria earns $30 million Saudi Arabia earns $100 million Saudi Arabia earns $80 million High output Nigeria earns $12 million Saudi Arabia earns $75 million Nigeria earns $20 million Saudi Arabia…
Question Suppose there are only two companies that make a product: Company X and Company Y. Now suppose that both companies have to choose one of two potential strategies for pricing their headphones: setting a low price or setting a high price. The table below shows the expected profits for each company under each pricing scenario. Assume both companies are in competition with each other and seek to maximize their profits. Under these conditions, how much profit should we expect both companies to earn? Company Y High Price Low Price Company X High Price Profit for Company Y: $1,709, 000 Profit for Company X: $1,709,000 Profit for Company Y: $2, 136, 000 Profit for Company X: $256,000 Provide your answer below: Low Price Profit for Company Y: $256, 000 Profit for Company X: $2,136,000 Profit for Company Y: $854,000 Profit for Company X: $854, 000
1. How would you characterize the strategy for competing internationally that Ford was pursuing prior to the arrival of Alan Mulally in 2006? What were the benefits of this strategy? What were the costs? Why was Ford pursuing this strategy? 2. What strategy is Mulally trying to get Ford to pursue with his One Ford initiative? What are the benefits of this strategy? Can you see any drawbacks? 3. Does the One Ford initiative imply that Ford will now ignore national and regional differences in demand?
May and Raj me the only two growers who provide organically grown corn to a local grocery store. They know that if they cooperated and produced less corn, they could raise the price of the com. If they work independently, they will each earn 100. If they decide to work together and both lower their output, they call each earn 150. If one person lowers output and the other does not, the person who lowers output will earn $1 and the other person will capture the entire market and will earn 200. Table 10.6 represents the choices available to Mary and Raj. What is the best choice for Raj if he is sole that Mary will cooperate? If Mary thinks Raj will cheat, what should Mary do and why? What is the prisoners dilemma result? What is the preferred choice if they could ensure cooperation? A = Work independently; B = Cooperate and Lower Output. (Each results entry lists Rajs earnings first, and Marys earnings second.)
(Figure: Oligopoly Pricing Strategy in Wireless TV Market II) Use Figure: Oligopoly Pricing Strategy in Wireless TV Market II. The noncooperative equilibrium in the cable TV market occurs when: Next Wireless Supreme Wireless High price Low price High price Next Wireless earns $100,000 Supreme Wireless earns $100,000 Next Wireless earns $80,000 Supreme Wireless earns $130,000 Low price Next Wireless earns $130,000 Supreme Wireless earns $80,000 Next Wireless earns $90,000 Supreme Wireless earns $90,000 O Next Wireless sets a high price and earns $80,000, and Supreme Wireless sets a low price and earns $130,000. O both firms set a high price, and each earns $100,000. K O Next Wireless sets a low price and earns $130,000, and Supreme Wireless sets a high price and earns $80,000. O both firms set a low price, and each earns $90,000.
Is the following a strategy for this game: Player 2: b fc Player 1: A D C 2 True False A d B e CD a 2 1 2 с 1 b A D 3 E 0 DO B 0 F -1 1000
"In an oligopoly game, the greater the number of players who are colluding:" the lower the possibility of cheating. the more elastic the demand curve of the cheater. the higher the payoff received by each player from colluding. the lower will be the profit from cheating.
Five roommates are planning to spend the weekend in their dorm room watching movies, and they are debating how many movies to watch. Here is their willingness to pay: Willingness to Pay (Dollars) Yakov Charles Gilberto Lorenzo Sam First film 18 15 10 8 5 Second film 16 12 8 5 1 Third film 14 9 6 0 0 Fourth film 12 6 3 0 0 Fifth film 10 3 0 0 0 Buying a DVD costs $20, which the roommates split equally, so each pays $4 per movie. The efficient number of movies to watch (that is, the number that maximizes total surplus) is movies. Complete the following table by indicating the preferred number of movies from the standpoint of each roommate. Roommate 0 1 2 3 4 5 Yakov Charles Gilberto Lorenzo Sam The median roommate prefers movies. Suppose the roommates…
1. A large share of the world supply of diamonds comes from Russia and South Africa. Suppose that the mar- ginal cost of mining diamonds is constant at $1,000 per diamond and the demand for diamonds is described by the following schedule: Price $8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 Quantity 5,000 diamonds 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 12,000 a. If there were many suppliers of diamonds, what would be the price and quantity? b. If there were only one supplier of diamonds, what would be the price and quantity? c. If Russia and South Africa formed a cartel, what would be the price and quantity? If the countries split the market evenly, what would be South Africa's production and profit? What would hap- pen to South Africa's profit if it increased its pro- duction by 1,000 while Russia stuck to the cartel agreement? d. Use your answers to part (c) to explain why cartel agreements are often not successful.
5. Choice between direct exporting and FDI Das Spielzeug is a profit-maximizing firm producing puzzles, which it can produce and sell in its home country, Germany, and abroad in Russia. The average cost (AC) curve on the following graph represents Das Spielzeug's cost of producing puzzles within one factory, whether in Germany or in Russia. ? 20 18 16 14 12 10 AC 0 10 80 90 100 20 30 40 50 60 70 QUANTITY (Thousands of puzzles) Suppose that at the current market price of puzzles, the demand for Das Spielzeug's product is 10,000 puzzles per year in Germany and 20,000 puzzles per year in Russia. (Hint: Select each point on the previous graph to see its coordinates.) per puzzle, produce 10,000 puzzles at Based on Das Spielzeug's average cost curve, within one factory it can produce 20,000 puzzles at $ per puzzle, and produce the total of 30,000 puzzles at $ per puzzle. Complete the following table by indicating Das Spielzeug's total production cost for each scenario. Total Production Cost…
Economics: Industrial Economics Question Consider the following sequential game between firm 1 and firm 2: First, firm 1 decides to either adopt an aggressive marketing strategy or not. Second, Firm 2 observes firm 1's decision and then also decides between its own aggressive strategy, a passive strategy or whether to leave the market altogether. The profits (in millions of dollars) of the firms are as follows: If both adopt an aggressive strategy, then firm 1's payoff is $14 and firm 2's is $1. If firm 1 adopts an aggressive strategy and firm 2 does not, then the payoff for firm 1 is $21 and for firm 2 is -$5. If firm 1 does nothing and firm 2 adopts an aggressive strategy, firm 1's payoff is $10 and firm 2's is $9. If both do nothing, then firm 1 makes $20 in profits and firm 2 makes $5. Finally, if firm 2 leaves the market altogether, it makes $0 and firm 1 makes $20 with an aggressive strategy and $24 without one. 1. Using the principle of backward induction, the most…