Consider the following Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of two different decision takers (i) and (ii): (1) v, = a- be(-Ay) (ii) V = a+ bln(y) where a e R,b>0, A>0, y > 0.
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- A driver's wealth $100,000 includes a car of $20,000. To install a car alarm costs the driver $1,750. The probability that the car is stolen is 0.2 when the car does not have an alarm and 0.1 when the car does have an alarm. Assume the driver's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is U(W) = ln(W). Suppose the driver is deciding between the following three options: (a) purchase no car insurance, do not install car alarm; (b) purchase fair insurance to replace the car, do not install car alarm; and (c) purchase no car insurance, install car alarm. Of these three options, the driver prefers: A. option (a). B. option (b). C. option (c). D. options (a) and (b). E. options (a) and (c). F. options (b) and (c). G. all options equally. H. none of these options.A driver's wealth $100,000 includes a car of $20,000. To install a car alarm costs the driver $1,750. The probability that the car is stolen is 0.2 when the car does not have an alarm and 0.1 when the car does have an alarm. Assume the driver's von Neumann- Morgenstern utility function is U(W) = In(W). Suppose the driver is deciding between the following three options: (a) purchase no car insurance, do not install car alarm; (b) purchase fair insurance to replace the car, do not install car alarm; and (c) purchase no car insurance, install car alarm. Of these three options, the driver prefers: A. option (a). B. option (b). C.option (c). D.options (a) and (b). E. options (a) and (c). F. options (b) and (c). G.all options equally. H.none of these options.An agent makes decisions using U(ct) = (ct−χct−1)1−γ 1−γ . Answer the following: (a) Suppose χ = 0. Derive an expression for the coefficient of relative risk aversion RR(ct)? (b) Suppose 0 < χ ≤ 1. Derive an expression for the coefficient of relative risk aversion RR(ct)?
- Can you explain how Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function should be understood and how it works mathematicallyProblem 3. Carol's risk preference is represented by the following expected utility formula: U(T, C₁; 1 T, C₂) = π √√ √₁+ (17) √√C₂. i) Suppose Carol is indifferent between the following two options: the first option A returns $100 with probability and $X with probability, and the second option B returns $49 for sure. Determine X. ii) Consider the following three lotteries: L₁ = (0.9, $100; 0.1, $49), L2 = (0.7, $225; 0.3, $49), and L3= (0.5, $400; 0.5, $0). What is the ranking of these lotteries for Carol? Calculate the risk premiums of these lotteries for Carol. 1If the utility function is U (W) = ((W0.75) / (0.75)), what is the absolute risk aversion coefficient?
- Cost-Benefit Analysis Suppose you can take one of two summer jobs. In the first job as a flight attendant, with a salary of $5,000, you estimate the probability you will die is 1 in 40,000. Alternatively, you could drive a truck transporting hazardous materials, which pays $12,000 and for which the probability of death is 1 in 10,000. Suppose that you're indifferent between the two jobs except for the pay and the chance of death. If you choose the job as a flight attendant, what does this say about the value you place on your life?Compute the RELATIVE risk aversion measure rr(W) of the following utility function (the form of which depends on the value of y. wl-Y –1 y 20,y #1 1-7 In W y =1 Is rr(W) dependent on W?Mr. Smith can cause an accident, which entails a monetary loss of $1000 to Ms. Adams. The likelihood of the accident depends on the precaution decisions by both individuals. Specifically, each individual can choose either “low" or "high" precaution, with the low precaution requiring no cost and the high precaution requiring the effort cost of $200 to the individual who chooses the high precaution. The following table describes the probability of an accident for each combination of the precaution choices by the two individuals. Adams chooses high precaution Adams chooses low precaution Smith chooses low precaution 0.8 0.5 Smith chooses high 0.7 0.1 precaution Question: For each of the following tort rules, (i) construct a table describing the individuals’ payoffs under different precaution pairs and (ii) find the equilibrium precaution choices by the individuals. a) No liability b) Strict liability (with full compensation) c) Negligence rule (with efficient legal standard of care) d)…
- Compute the RELATIVE risk aversion measure rr(W) of the following utility function (the form of which depends on the value of y. w-Y -1 y 20,y +1 1-7 In W y =1 Is rr(W) dependent on W?Consider a worker whose utility is equal to the amount of dollars she has (U = $) and who can earn $100 a day as a bank teller. However, she takes a job as a worker in a firm that produces shirts. She and her coworkers are monitored at random by their employer to see if they are exerting a target level of effort of e* = 15 units. Assume that the probability of any worker being monitored is p. Also assume that e* is the same level of effort the worker would have to exert as a bank teller. If she is monitored and her employer finds that she is exerting at least 15 units of effort, she is paid > $100. If she is caught putting in less than 15 units of effort, she is fired on the spot but given severance pay of w < w. Say that she suffers a disutility of effort of $2, in monetary terms, for every unit of effort she exerts, so that the dollar cost of exerting the target level of effort of e* is - 2e*. (If she chooses to exert a lower level of effort than e*, we can assume that she will not…Suppose that you graduate from college next year and you have two career options: 1) You will start a job in an investment bank paying a $100,000 annual salary. 2) You will start a Ph.D. in economics and, as a student, you will receive a $20,000 salary. You are bad with decisions, so you are letting a friend of yours decide for you by flipping a coin. The probabilities of options 1 and 2 are, therefore, each 50%. a) Illustrate, using indifference curves, your preferences regarding consumption choices in the two different states of the world. Assume that you are risk-averse. [Include also the 45 degrees line in your figure] b) Now show how the indifference curves would change if you were substantially more risk averse than before. Explain. c) Now show the indifference curves if you are risk neutral and if you are risk loving. d) Show your expected utility preferences from point a) mathematically.