An industry contains two firms and the inverse demand function for the firms output is P-180-30, where is the total oups ose that firm I's cost and marginal cost functions are C(q)- 30q; and MC(q)-30, while firm 2's cost and marginal cost functions -q² and MC(q)-2q2 Determine each firm's Nash equilibrium output. Determine each firm's profit at the Nash equilibrium output.

An industry contains two firms and the inverse demand function for the firms output is P-180-30, where is the total oups ose that firm I's cost and marginal cost functions are C(q)- 30q; and MC(q)-30, while firm 2's cost and marginal cost functions -q² and MC(q)-2q2 Determine each firm's Nash equilibrium output. Determine each firm's profit at the Nash equilibrium output.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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