(a) Suppose that the two consumer share the same belief about the states: 7₁ = 7² = 7₁ and 7² = 7² = 7₂. Show that at an interior Arrow-Debreu equilibrium consumer b insures completely. (b) Suppose that the two consumers have different beliefs about the states. Show that at an interior equilibrium consumer b will not insure completely. Which is the direction of the bias in terms of the differences in subjective probabilities? Argue also that consumer a will not gain from trade.

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter13: General Equilibrium And Welfare
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 13.1P
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[Taken from MWG 19.C.4] Consider an exchange economy with a single consumption good, two
states, and two consumers. Each consumer's preferences are represented by
u" (x*) = nx + Tx
and
u" (x*) = 7 log x} + n log x²,
where x, is the amount of good consumed in state s by consumer i, and 7 is the subjective prob-
ability of consumer i for state s. Since consumer a's (b's) Bernoulli utility function is assumed
linear (concave), a is risk-neutral (risk-averse, respectively). The total endowments of this econ-
omy also depends on the state: w = (w,w2). Assume that each consumer is endowed with its
half: w" = w = }(wr,w2).
(a) Suppose that the two consumer share the same belief about the states:
nf = n = T1
T = n = 12.
and
Show that at an interior Arrow-Debreu equilibrium consumer b insures completely.
(b) Suppose that the two consumers have different beliefs about the states. Show that at an
interior equilibrium consumer b will not insure completely. Which is the direction of the
bias in terms of the differences in subjective probabilities? Argue also that consumer a will
not gain from trade.
Transcribed Image Text:[Taken from MWG 19.C.4] Consider an exchange economy with a single consumption good, two states, and two consumers. Each consumer's preferences are represented by u" (x*) = nx + Tx and u" (x*) = 7 log x} + n log x², where x, is the amount of good consumed in state s by consumer i, and 7 is the subjective prob- ability of consumer i for state s. Since consumer a's (b's) Bernoulli utility function is assumed linear (concave), a is risk-neutral (risk-averse, respectively). The total endowments of this econ- omy also depends on the state: w = (w,w2). Assume that each consumer is endowed with its half: w" = w = }(wr,w2). (a) Suppose that the two consumer share the same belief about the states: nf = n = T1 T = n = 12. and Show that at an interior Arrow-Debreu equilibrium consumer b insures completely. (b) Suppose that the two consumers have different beliefs about the states. Show that at an interior equilibrium consumer b will not insure completely. Which is the direction of the bias in terms of the differences in subjective probabilities? Argue also that consumer a will not gain from trade.
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