A dominant or price setting firm and several smaller price takers serve a market where total market demand is Qd = 560 – 2P and the combined supply from all the smaller firms is Qs = - 60 + 2P. Does this market meet the assumptions that the dominant firm has at least a market share of 50%? (you must motivate your answer numerically)
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A dominant or price setting firm and several smaller price takers serve a market where total market demand is Qd = 560 – 2P and the combined supply from all the smaller firms is Qs = - 60 + 2P.
Does this market meet the assumptions that the dominant firm has at least a market share of 50%? (you must motivate your answer numerically)
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- A dominant or price setting firm and several smaller price takers serve a market where total market demand is Qd = 560 – 2P and the combined supply from all the smaller firms is Qs = - 60 + 2P. State the demand (Qdf=) and inverse demand (Pdf=) function for the dominant firm (df).Consider an industry with N firms that compete by setting the quantities of an identical product simultaneously. The resulting market price is given by: p = 1000 − 4Q. The total cost function of each firm is C(qi) = 50 + 20qi . (a) Derive the output reaction of firm i to the belief that its rivals are jointly producing a total output of Q-i . Assuming that every firm produces the same quantity in equilibrium, use your answer to compute that quantity. (b) Suppose firms would enter (exit) this industry if the existing firms were making a profit (loss). Write down a mathematical equation, the solution to which would give you the equilibrium number of firms in this industry. You don’t have to solve this equation.Here is a market with three firms: 1, 2, and 3. The demand curve is P=100-Q. There is no fixed cost but the marginal cost 10 for all firms. Firm 1 is a leader firm so that it decides the quantity Q1 first. Then two firms respectively decide their quantities Q2 and Q3 simultaneously. 1) At an equilibrium (SPE), Q1 is Q2=Q3= 2) At the equilibrium, (the market quantity) Q= and (the market price) P= 3) The profit of firm 1 is while the profit of firm 2 and 3 respectively is
- Two firms compete on price every year. The inverse demand function each firm faces depends on which firm has chosen the lowest price that year. The one that did captures the entire market. If, on the other hand, both prices are the same then they split the market evenly. Consumers round up prices to the nearest integer. For the firm with the lowest price p, demand is given by: q = 24-2p: Marginal costs are constant and equal to $4 for both firms. a. Define the Normal form of the stage game and determine the Nash Equilibria, the Cooperative Equilibrium and the Optimal Deviation from cooperation. b. For the once repeated (2 stages) game, determine if a Nash Equilibrium exists that improves on simply playing the (better) Nash Equilibrium of the stage game twice c. For the infinitely repeated game, determine what the interest rate would have to be to prevent the firms from cooperating. d*. Determine the relation between the interest rate and the number of punishment periods in a…PROBLEM (5) In a dominant firm market with demand Q = 30 − p, the dominant firm has MC(Q) = 2Q (that is, with TC(Q) = Q^2) and the fringe is composed of 5 identical firms, each with MC(Q) = 10Q (that is, with TC(Q) = 5Q^2). (a) Calculate the market price in the dominant firm model. Calculate the quantity produced by the fringe. (b) Now assume that the 5 fringe firms form a “union”, and act as 5 “plants” of the union firm and this union firm competes as one single firm against the dominant firm in quantities, as in Cournot competition. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity in this market organization? (c) Now, the dominant firm convinces the “union” not to compete with it but instead collude (to maximize the sum of profits) to form a cartel. What is the market price and quantity? (d) Back to the problem description. If all the firms (the dominant firm and the 5 fringe firms) acted as price takers, as in the perfect competition, what would be the market equilibrium…Suppose the market for a certain good is controlled by a single firm I (incumbent). Now, a second firm C (challenger) considers entering the market. In case of no entrance (ne), profits are TC = 0 and TI = 50 , respectively. In case of entry (e), firm I can either retaliate (r) which induces losses for both firms TC = T] = -10, or not retaliate (nr) which induces profits of TC respectively. 10 and TI = 20 (a) Depict this game in extensive form. (b) Find an equilibrium by backward induction. (c) Find all other equilibria (in pure and mixed strategies).
- American Airlines (A) and Hawaiian Airlines (H) are two large airlines in the US market. The market has Market Demand: P = 506 - QM where QM denotes the number of passengers of the total market per day. American Airlines operates with a Fixed Cost of $3400 per day no matter whether the plane flies or not and at a Marginal Cost of $9 per passenger. While Hawaiian Airlines operates with a lower Fixed Cost of $2400 per day no matter whether the plane flies or not and at a higher Marginal Cost of $17 per passenger. Suppose now American Airlines and Hawaiian Airlines are competing in Price, i.e. they are in Bertrand Competition. Suppose both airlines can only set the price as an integer. If the airline loses the market, it supplied 0 quantity. Answer the following questions from the drop-down list: 1. American Airlines' Equilibrium Price = $ 2. Hawaiian Airlines' Equilibrium Price = $ 3. American Airlines' Equilibrium Quantity = 4. Hawaiian Airlines' Equilibrium Quantity = 5. Profit of…Two firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models; 1)Cournot Model 2) Bertrand Model 3) Tacit Collusion Model.Consider a market where two firms produce the same product, and compete by choosing the price to charge consumers. There are no capacity constraints and no fixed costs. Consumers purchase from the firm that charges the lowest price, Pmin Aggregate demand is given by Q(Pmin) = 600 – 30pmin. Both firms have marginal costs of c = 15. What is the aggregate quantity produced in this market? And what price do consumers pay? (a) p₁ = = 15, p2 = 20, Q = 150 (b) P1 = P2 = 15, Q = 150 (c) P₁ = P₂ = 20, Q = 0 (d) p₁ = 10, P2 = 15, Q = 300 (e) None of the above options is correct.
- Two firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB= Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models; 1) Bertrand modelTwo firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following model: (A) tacit collusion modelTwo firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models: (a) Cournot Model (b) Bertrand Model (c) Tacit Collusion Model.