1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x = 0 and x = 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x1 .3 and x2 .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x = .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates = 11 =

1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x = 0 and x = 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x1 .3 and x2 .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x = .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates = 11 =

Macroeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617390

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter19: Public Choice And Special Interest Group Politics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1WNG

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Answer to Part CAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences?
1.17. Jones and Smith are running for public office. There are 99 voters.(a) Suppose the rules say that Jones wins if she receives 50 or morevotes; otherwise Smith wins. Is this method neutral?(b) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receivesa number of votes that is between 60 and 89. (If neither candidategets a winning number of votes, then the election is a tie.) Is thismethod monotone?(c) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receives anodd number of votes. (If neither candidate gets a winning numberof votes, then the election is a tie.) Is this method decisive?(d) Suppose that the rules say that Smith wins the election no matterwhat. Is this method anonymous?
Answer to Part DAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D. If the tax in C induces 100% compliance…
In a congressional district somewhere in the U.S., a new representative is being elected. The voters all have one-dimensional political views that can be neatly arrayed on a left-right spectrum. We can define the ”location” of a citizen’s political views in the following way. The citizen with the most extreme left-wing views is said to be at point 0 and the citizen with the most extreme right-wing views is said to be at point 1. If a citizen has views that are to the right of the views of the fraction x of the state’s population, that citizen’s views are said to be located at point x. There are two candidates for the congressional seat and they are forced to publicly state their own political position simultaneously on the zero-one left-right scale. 1.a Suppose voters always vote for the candidate whose stated position is nearest to their own views and suppose each candidate cares only about getting as many votes as possible. In equilibrium, what will be the two candidates’ positions?…
4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.
Does traditional one-person-one-vote (1p1v) majority voting allow voters to directly express differences in strengths of preference? Does quadratic voting do any better? Discuss the differences and then explain which system you prefer, and why.
Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Assuming the following voter preferences: True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 4. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D. If the tax in C induces 100% compliance (everyone votes), did this tax…
urgent 1.15. Consider the Supreme Court as an electorate of 9 members thatvotes yes-or-no on a variety of issues. It is customary for this electorateto use the simple majority method, and since 9 is an odd number, no tiescan result when no justices are absent. Imagine the following alternativemethod for determining Supreme Court decisions. The decision is affirmative whenever at least 3 of the first 5 justices vote to affirm. Otherwisethe decision is negative. This is just the bloc voting method, where thejustices form blocs of size 5, 1, 1, 1, and 1. (This method emulates whatwould occur if the first 5 justices were to agree to always vote as a blocand to decide among themselves how the bloc should rule.)(a) Is this method anonymous?(b) Is this method neutral?(c) Is this method monotone?(d) If you were one of the 4 justices not among the first 5, why wouldyou complain about this voting method?
Answer and explain your answer correctly. I will rate accordingly with multiple votes...
There is an election with three candidates: Lady Left (LL). Care Central (CC), and Robert Right (RR). The following are the outcomes in various two- and three-way races: CC. 100%. RR, 0% /LL, 0%. CC/ 100% RR, 51%, LL, 49% RR, 35%. LU 33% CC 329 The voting system is such that first there is a three way race. Then, if none of the three candidates wins more than 50% of the votes, there is a two-way runoff election between the two can Is this voting system consistent? Explain which property of consistency is violated, if any. Short answer
with largest remall 6. In Table 13.15, we again show the same results from the Oslo district in the 2005 Norwegian elections. Answer the following questions. As before, you should ignore the "others" category. a. Copy Table 13.15. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo are to be allocated according to the d'Hondt divisor method. Show the different quotients that are calculated when you divide each party's vote total by the d'Hondt divisors in your table. How many seats does each party obtain? b. Now repeat the process using the Sainte-Laguë divisor method and then the modified Sainte-Laguë divisor method. Note that you will need to change the integers used to estimate the quotients. How many seats does each party obtain under these divisor systems? c. Are there any differences if you examine the seat allocations from the two quota systems and the three divisor systems? Does one method produce a more proportional or fairer outcome in your opinion than another? TABLE 13.15 Legislative…
4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?