The only strategies that remain after iterated deletion of dominated strategies are those that ... ... are the dominant strategies. ... should be played with equal probability as a mixed strategy. ... could be best responses under some belief about the other players' strategies, assuming everyone is acting rationally. O... yield the same expected payoff against the most likely combination of the other players' strategies.

The only strategies that remain after iterated deletion of dominated strategies are those that ... ... are the dominant strategies. ... should be played with equal probability as a mixed strategy. ... could be best responses under some belief about the other players' strategies, assuming everyone is acting rationally. O... yield the same expected payoff against the most likely combination of the other players' strategies.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2MC

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