Short Answer Part 1 Consider this as a simultaneous-move (static) game: Player A Top Bottom Player B Left Right 5,1 1,3 0,4 2,4 1.a) Write down the Best Response Correspondence for each of the two players. 1.b) Does any player have a dominant strategy in this game? Explain. 1.c) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure strategies of this game.

Short Answer Part 1 Consider this as a simultaneous-move (static) game: Player A Top Bottom Player B Left Right 5,1 1,3 0,4 2,4 1.a) Write down the Best Response Correspondence for each of the two players. 1.b) Does any player have a dominant strategy in this game? Explain. 1.c) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure strategies of this game.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3MC

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Short Answer Part 1 Consider this as a simultaneous-move (static) game: Player B Left Right Top 5, 1 0,4 Player A Bottom 1, 3 2, 4 1.a) Write down the Best Response Correspondence for each of the two players. 1.b) Does any player have a dominant strategy in this game? Explain. 1.c) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure strategies of this game. 1.d) Is there any Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies? If so, find it.
Up ооооо Down Player 1 Up No EFFICIENT equilibrium exists Down Up Down Player 2 P1 gets $120 P2 gets $5 P1 gets $100 P2 gets $10 P1 gets $95 P2 gets $95 In the game above, what is/are the EFFICIENT sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium? (up,up) (up,down) (down, up) (down, down) P1 gets $15 P2 gets $25
Aedri Quick Lesson in Game Theory A Nash Equilibrium is an outcome in which neither player is better off by changing their strategy. 2.7 Is a Dominant Strategy equilibrium also a Nash equilibrium? a) Yes b) No esc The Ice Cream Guys $3.99 $4.99 + Chucky's Chunky CCT: $20,000 $3.99 ICG: $20,000 CCT: $60,000 ICG: $10,000 tab Treats CCT: $10,000 $4.99 ICG: $60,000 CCT: $40,000 ICG: $40,000 The table above is the payoff matrix for the annual profit of the only two ice-cream-truck firms operating in Beach City. They are deciding the price of an ice cream cone. %3D caps lo 2.8 What is Chucky's dominant strategy? a) $3.99 b) $4.99 c) Not enough information hift 2.9 What is the dominant strategy equilibrium in this situation? a) Both charge $3.99 b) Both charge $4.99 c) CCT charges $3.99 and ICG charges $4.99 d) CCT charges $4.99 and ICG charges $3.99 2.10 Suppose these two firms engaged in collusion (which, of course, totally doesn't happen because it is against the law). Which outcome would…
Question 9 Player 1 Y Player 2 3,2 2 -0,1 1,3 -0,1 Which of the following is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilbrium in this game?
5. Aaron and Betty play the following one-shot game. Aaron Up Middle Down Left 10,0 5,10 1,1 Betty Right 0,5 1,0 2,2 a. Does the game above have any (pure strategy) Nash equilibria? Find any equilibria or explain why an equilibrium doesn't exist. b. Suppose instead that Aaron moves first and Betty moves second. Represent this situation with a game tree and find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Are Aaron and Betty better off playing a simultaneous game or a sequential game in which Aaron moves first? Explain. c.
2. Consider the following game: u 1 r 6,0 0,6 d 3,2 6,0 Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this game? Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
(b) ROWENA up Answer 1: up Answer 2: In this simultaneous move game, the iterated dominance equilibrium is (Rowena's . Colin's left left Answer 3: ). This game has two Nash equilibria one of which is the iterated dominance equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium, which is not the IDE, is (Rowena's down Colin's right down Up Down Answer 4: Left right 0,0 0,0 COLIN Right 0,0 1,1
Consider the following simultaneous game: Player 1 U D Player 2 L 20,-10 -10, 20 R -10, 20 20,-10 Please indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false. Player 1 has a dominant strategy. This game has a Nash equilibrium. This game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 1's best response is D if player 2 plays R.
Quick Lesson in Game Theory A Nash Equilibrium is an outcome in which neither player is better off by changing their strategy. 2.7 Is a Dominant Strategy equilibrium also a Nash equilibrium? a) Yes b) No The Ice Cream Guys $3.99 $4.99 Chucky's Chunky CCT: $20,000 $3.99 ICG: $20,000 CCT: $60,000 ICG: $10,000 CCT: $10,000 $4.99 ICG: $60,000 CCT: $40,000 ICG: $40,000 Treats The table above is the payoff matrix for the annual profit of the only two ice-cream-truck firms operating in Beach City. They are deciding the price of an ice cream cone. 2.8 What is Chucky's dominant strategy? a) $3.99 b) $4.99 c) Not enough information 2.9 What is the dominant strategy equilibrium in this situation? a) Both charge $3.99 b) Both charge $4.99 c) CCT charges $3.99 and ICG charges $4.99 d) CCT charges $4.99 and ICG charges $3.99 2.10 Suppose these two firms engaged in collusion (which, of course, totally doesn't happen because it is against the law). Which outcome would they agree upon, if any? a) Both…
Suppose that Green Giant and Red Rover are two companies competing in the canned vegetable market. Each is contemplating an aggressive new ad campaign. The payoffs of each decision are listed below, where Green Giant is player 1. Green/Red Ad Campaign No Ad Campaign |Ad Campaign |1 million, 1 million zero, 3 million No Ad Campaign 3 million, zero 2 million, 2 million What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? a. (advertise, don't advertise) b. (advertise, advertise) c. (don't advertise, don't advertise) d. (don't advertise, advertise)
Solve for the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) in each of the following games. (a) The following two-by-two game is a little harder to solve since firm 2’spreferred strategy depends of what firm 1 does. But firm 1 has a dominantstrategy so this game has one Nash equilibrium. Firm 2 Launch Don’tFirm 1 Launch 60, -10 100, 0 Don’t 80, 30 120, 0 What is the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous-move game? (b) What would the outcome of this game be if instead firm 1 moved first and then, after seeing what firm 1 chose, firm 2 chose it strategy? In this case firm 1 doesn’t necessarily need to choose a best response, but firm 2 must choose a best response since it moves second.
2. Brad and Angelina have agreed to meet up for their first date. Neither of them can remember the exact location where they arranged to meet up and have forgotten their phones at home. Their payoff matrix can be described as follows: Brad The Hive Le Monde a) What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? Angelina The Hive 5; 5 0; 0 Le Monde 0; 0 5; 5