2) Authentication Phase: - Device will make an authorization request (Authreq, DID) - Server will go to Database get relevant challenge (C_DID) know the relevant "golden" response, create Nonce (h) - Server Encrypt this challenge and Nonce and send to Device Device will decrypt this challenge with its private key. - Device will create response (R) and with Nonce send to server back. 3) Hamming Distance (HD) is the noise. We are comparing "golden" response + noise (+ HD) compare with Response (R) so let's "old proven" is okay, I can change this ratio later. Please can you help me with the questions below: Why protocol is secure ? How well this could work and so on? Mean discussion and comment on this protocol Thanks in advance 1) Enrollment Phase: - First Device will send its Device identification (DID) to Server - Server will send its Public key - PUF produce a "golden" response with challenge - Device (D) will send "golden" response with DID + Device Challenge (C_DID) encrypted with Device Public key - Server will take this (C_DID, s, DID) Pub_DID Decrypted with its private key and store it.

2) Authentication Phase: - Device will make an authorization request (Authreq, DID) - Server will go to Database get relevant challenge (C_DID) know the relevant "golden" response, create Nonce (h) - Server Encrypt this challenge and Nonce and send to Device Device will decrypt this challenge with its private key. - Device will create response (R) and with Nonce send to server back. 3) Hamming Distance (HD) is the noise. We are comparing "golden" response + noise (+ HD) compare with Response (R) so let's "old proven" is okay, I can change this ratio later. Please can you help me with the questions below: Why protocol is secure ? How well this could work and so on? Mean discussion and comment on this protocol Thanks in advance 1) Enrollment Phase: - First Device will send its Device identification (DID) to Server - Server will send its Public key - PUF produce a "golden" response with challenge - Device (D) will send "golden" response with DID + Device Challenge (C_DID) encrypted with Device Public key - Server will take this (C_DID, s, DID) Pub_DID Decrypted with its private key and store it.

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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