Henry Craik, ed. English Prose. 1916.
Vol. I. Fourteenth to Sixteenth Century
John Locke (16321704)
[John Locke, the son of a Somersetshire attorney, was born in 1632. He was educated at Westminster School, under Dr. Busby, and passed to Christ Church in 1652, where after taking his degree he became Greek Lecturer. Being relieved of the condition of taking orders, which was attached to his studentship, he devoted himself chiefly to the study of medicine, and continued this study in later life, in the intervals allowed him by public employment and by philosophical pursuits. It was in his medical capacity that he formed the close friendship with Lord Shaftesbury (the Achitophel of Dryden’s Satire) which greatly influenced his life, and which subsequently involved him in a suspicion of complicity with Shaftesbury’s revolutionary designs, and led to his expulsion from Christ Church. Weak health enforced, and a sufficient competence made possible, a life of considerable leisure, which he spent largely in travel and in discursive scientific and philosophical researches. In these he reflected the spirit of the Royal Society (of which he was a leading member) and of the Latitudinarian party of the day. An ardent supporter of the Revolution, he returned to England with the Prince of Orange: and published the Essay on Human Understanding (his most important work) in 1690. His Two Treatises of Government, written in opposition to Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, appeared in the same year. His first Letter on Toleration had been published in 1686; and three other letters on the same subject followed—the last appearing after his death. In 1693 he published his Thoughts on Education. He filled some important public offices, especially in connection with the scheme for the colonisation of Carolina (in the reign of Charles II.), and the Commission on Trade (under William III.) He died in 1704.]
But it is not our business here to present in detail, or to criticise, the theories of Locke, whether in philosophy, education, or politics. We have only to examine his style. And here he is entitled to the praise of entirely subordinating style to subject. This is no small sign of literary art: and such literary art we cannot deny to Locke. He was a man to whom the niceties of language were of little moment; but he was of calm and equable temper, impressed with a sense of what was dignified and becoming, adequately acquainted with the masterpieces of literary genius, and always scrupulous, in his language, to observe rules and to obey the dictates of what in literature is analogous to courtesy in social intercourse. It would be absurd to say that Locke’s style is nervous, or original, or instinct with any impulse of feeling, or stimulated by any current of imagination. But it is almost always correct; it flows evenly and smoothly, and has dignity and even grace, if it lacks variety and force. It is seen at its worst, perhaps, in his philosophical work, where his very limitations of thought made him prone to argue in a circle, and give to his style a character of dull and heavy monotony. It is much more easy in his Treatise on Education, where he is made more direct and practical by contact with the facts of life, and where he often inculcates his precepts in homely and racy English. In his political writing he endeavours, not always successfully, to be popular, and to gain the ear of a wider audience. In the opening chapters of his Two Treatises on Government the effort to attain this popularity in phraseology is clearly seen, and the effort is not unsuccessful. But it quickly dies away. The student and the literary recluse assert themselves over the pamphleteer: and the style presently falls into the orderly and correct prose of the literary theorist, and deserts the more lively outbursts of the partisan politician. But if Locke is never original in his style, and never shows the force and vigour of one who speaks straight to the deeper instincts of human nature, we must still accord to him the praise of regularity, of dignity, of scrupulous accuracy in diction, up to the measure of logical accuracy to which his thought attained.