Your professor has decided that, from now on, students who receive less than a 60 percent grade onany exam will be eligible to go to a review session. Ifthey attend the session, they will receive an extra 10percent on their grade. You see a problem with thispolicy, and instead propose to your professor thatpeople who go to the review session should receive50 percent of the difference between their grade and60 percent. Explain why this situation represents atrade-off between equity and efficiency

Your professor has decided that, from now on, students who receive less than a 60 percent grade onany exam will be eligible to go to a review session. Ifthey attend the session, they will receive an extra 10percent on their grade. You see a problem with thispolicy, and instead propose to your professor thatpeople who go to the review session should receive50 percent of the difference between their grade and60 percent. Explain why this situation represents atrade-off between equity and efficiency

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8MC

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This is the answer.. plz write in hand written Here, the given decision tree shows that player 1 moves either to enter or not to enter, while player 2 has two options to choose that are concede and price war. When analyzing the given information, it can be seen that player 1 will surely enter the market as it will give him higher payoff than the payoff when he does not enter as does not enter gives him $1 billion, while entry will give him either $2 billion or $1.5 billion. Therefore, player 1 will enter. After the entry of player 1, player 2 has an incentive to choose to concede as it will give him the payoff of$1.5 billion, while price war will give him $1 billion. Therefore, the outcome of this game would be: (Enter, Concede)
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you and a friend decide to run a three mile race. If you agree to run together, you keep up with himfor the first mile, but you overexert yourself and run the last two miles at slower paces on your own. Tomake up for lost time, your friend runs the last two miles at a faster pace. Your mile times are 6:30, 7:00,and 7:30. Your friend’s times are 6:30, 6:00, and 6:00. If you both agree to run on your own, you run aconstant pace of 7:05 while your friend runs at a constant pace of 6:05. If you want to run together butyour friend wants to run solo, he runs his constant pace of 6:05. You, on the other hand, want to showhim that you can run faster, but you end up overexerting yourself after the first mile. You run times of6:20, 7:05, and 7:30. If he wants to run together but you do not, you both run at your pace of 7:05. Thissituation can be turned into an economic game, with the payoffs the overall race times. You each wantto run the fastest time you possibly can.(a) Who are the players in…
2.19. Standard setting. Suppose Apple and Samsung are in the process of negotiating a common standard for a new 3D camera tech- nology they plan to introduce in the next generation of smartphones. Apple has a preference for standard A, whereas Samsung has a pref- erence for standard S. However, both recognize that multiple stan- dards are a worse outcome for all. Specifically, Apple gets 240 if it selects A and Samsung does so too, but only 20 if Samsung does not adopt A. If Apple adopts standard S and Samsung does so too, then Apple gets a payoff of 190. If, however, Samsung chooses A then Ap- ple gets zero. For Samsung, the situation looks similar: If Samsung chooses standard S and Apple does the same then Samsung gets 210, but if Apple chooses A the Samsung's payoff is only 30. If Samsung opts for standard A and Apple does so too then Samsung gets a pay- off of 110, whereas if Apple chooses standard S then Samsung gets a payoff of zero. (a) Suppose that both Apple and Samsung…