with Augeas, the king and the hero make alternating offers to each other. Only one offer per day is allowed. If the offer is accepted, Heracles cleans the stables and receives the agreed payment. If the offer is rejected, the king and the hero have to wait one day before the new offer is made. Each day, both Augeas and Heracles have an option of abandoning the enterprise of cleaning the stables for good and receiving a payoff of zero. (a) Formalize this problem as an extensive-form game. (b) Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. (c) Find a Nash equilibrium of this game that is not subgame perfect. Using this equilibrium as an example, explain why subgame perfection is a reasonable requirement for equilibria in extensive form games.

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Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly
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3. Heracles and Augeas are bargaining over the payment for cleaning the Augean stables. If the
stables are cleaned right away, Heracles and Augeas will jointly get a surplus worth 999 gold
coins. However, every day of delay is costly-it reduces the surplus by 333 gold coins. Starting
Transcribed Image Text:3. Heracles and Augeas are bargaining over the payment for cleaning the Augean stables. If the stables are cleaned right away, Heracles and Augeas will jointly get a surplus worth 999 gold coins. However, every day of delay is costly-it reduces the surplus by 333 gold coins. Starting
with Augeas, the king and the hero make alternating offers to each other. Only one offer per day
is allowed. If the offer is accepted, Heracles cleans the stables and receives the agreed payment.
If the offer is rejected, the king and the hero have to wait one day before the new offer is made.
Each day, both Augeas and Heracles have an option of abandoning the enterprise of cleaning
the stables for good and receiving a payoff of zero.
(a) Formalize this problem as an extensive-form game.
(b) Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
(c) Find a Nash equilibrium of this game that is not subgame perfect. Using this equilibrium
as an example, explain why subgame perfection is a reasonable requirement for equilibria
in extensive form games.
Transcribed Image Text:with Augeas, the king and the hero make alternating offers to each other. Only one offer per day is allowed. If the offer is accepted, Heracles cleans the stables and receives the agreed payment. If the offer is rejected, the king and the hero have to wait one day before the new offer is made. Each day, both Augeas and Heracles have an option of abandoning the enterprise of cleaning the stables for good and receiving a payoff of zero. (a) Formalize this problem as an extensive-form game. (b) Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. (c) Find a Nash equilibrium of this game that is not subgame perfect. Using this equilibrium as an example, explain why subgame perfection is a reasonable requirement for equilibria in extensive form games.
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