Use this information for questions 19-22.Consider the Acid Rain Game with new payoffs below. Total net benefits aregiven in the payoff matrix below.Country B$96O $108$90Low$120AbatementHighAbatementCountry ALowAbatementA: $20B: $10A: $21B: $7Imagine Country B discounts future profits at d=0.9. If you know that Country Awill use the grim reaper punishment, what is the present value of net benefitsfrom deviating for Country B?HighAbatementA: $14B: $18A: $22B: $12

Grim trigger is a trigger strategy for a recurrent game in game theory. A player utilising grim…

Use this information for questions 19-22. Consider the Acid Rain Game with new payoffs below. Total net benefits are given in the payoff matrix below. Country B Low Abatement Country A Low Abatement A: $20 B: $10 High Abatement A: $14 B: $18

Use this information for questions 19-22. Consider the Acid Rain Game with new payoffs below. Total net benefits are given in the payoff matrix below. Country B Low Abatement Country A Low Abatement A: $20 B: $10 High Abatement A: $14 B: $18

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.1IP

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You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…
3. Find the saddle point, if it exists, for the following game. (b) Solve the following game by using the principle of dominance and find the probabilities of strategies for each player and the value of the game. Player B Player A II III IV V 3 4 4 II 2 4 III 4 4 IV 4 4 20 2420 8760
2 Consider the two investments listed below with possible outcomes and probabilities: INVESTMENT (in $1000) SAFE RISKY INVESTMENT AMOUNTⓇ 40+ 40+ GOOD SCENARIO OUTCOME 45+ 80+ AVERAGE+ SCENARIO PROB OUTCOME 0.40* 0.40€ 42+ 45+ BAD+ SCENARIO PROB OUTCOME PROB 0.20 35+ 0.20 10+ 0.40€ 0.40+ b) a) Suppose I have utility function U(*) = (x)2. What is the expected utility from each investment? Which investment will I choose, if any? Show and explain your work and provide the intuition. c) What is the value of the risk premium for the SAFE investment? Show and explain your work and provide the intuition. d) What is the value of the risk premium for the RISKY investment? Show and explain your work and provide the intuition.< +
Suppose that the University of Alabama and Clemson are making spending decisions for theupcoming year. Assume that Alabama is currently spending $15 million on their recruiting andfacilities, and Clemson is spending $10 million. Each team has an additional $5 million to spendor keep as profits. If they both choose to not spend the additional $5 million then Alabama hasa 60% chance of getting the highest quality quarterback recruit to commit to them (getting thecommitment of the player is the goal). However, if they both choose to spend the additional $5million then there is a 57% chance that Alabama gets the high quality quarterback to commit. IfAlabama spends the additional $5 million but Clemson doesn’t then there is a 67% chanceAlabama gets the recruit. However, if Alabama does NOT spend the additional $5million butClemson does then there is a 50% change either team gets the recruit’s commitment. Setup thepayoff matrix and label the players, their strategies, and their payoffs, and…
7. Suppose the only game in town involves flipping a fair coin (so Heads and Tails are equally likely), with a $x bet. If Heads comes up, the payoff is $0.9x; if Tails comes up, you lose the $x. You have $10,000, and must win at least $5,000 by tomorrow morning to pay off a debt to a mean dude. a. Compute the likelihood of winning at least $5000 by making a single bet of $10,000. b. Compute the likelihood of winning at least $1000 by playing the game 10,0000 times and betting a dollar each time. What is the likelihood of not losing money? Message learned?
There are 2 players. They take Ston eS From the Pilt of 6 Stones. Player 1 can takt only 2 or 3 Stones. piayer 2 can taKeS only 2 or 4 StonesS. P layers take turns, observe dil Previous moves, and player 1 mover first. A pla yer loses if She can not make a legal move, While another player ir declared the Winner. Let the pay oF OF Winning egval to 1 and the payoFF OF losing equal to 0. a) represent the in ɛxtemsive Form (depict Only legalmoes) b) Find all SPNE OF this game& explain your a mwwer. Who Will Win ? game Only legalmar)
Assuming you are risk neutral, frast answer the folowing two questions about your preferences: Scenario A: You are given $5.000 and offered a choice beheeen receiving an extra $2.500 with certainty or fipping a coin and getting $5.000 t heads or S0 if tain. Which option do you prefer? A The certain $2.500 is more valuable than the uncertain $5.000, I would choose the $2.500 Both options have identical payofs, so l am indiferent between the two options. The possibility of the 5.000 payoff is more valuable to me than the oertain $2.500, I chocse to fio a coin Scenario B. You are given $10.000 f you wil make the following choice: retum $2.500 or fip a coin and retum $5.000 heads and so tai. Which opton do you prefer? A The certain los of S$2.500 is more paintu than the possible loss of $5,000, I choose to fip a coin. OR The ponsibility of the los of $5.000 is more paintul to me than the certain los of $2.500, I would choose the $2.500 certan loss re Both options have identical payoffs, so…
1. A dealer decides to sell a rare book by means of an English auction with a reservation price of 54. There are two bidders. The dealer believes that there are only three possible values, 90, 54, and 45, that each bidder’s willingness to pay might take. Each bidder has a probability of 1/3 of having each of these willingnesses to pay, and the probabilities for each of the two bidders are independent of the other’s valuation. Assuming that the two bidders bid rationally and do not collude, the dealer’s expected revenue is approximately ______. 2. A seller knows that there are two bidders for the object he is selling. He believes that with probability 1/2, one has a buyer value of 5 and the other has a buyer value of 10 and with probability 1/2, one has a buyer value of 8 and the other has a buyer value of 15. He knows that bidders will want to buy the object so long as they can get it for their buyer value or less. He sells it in an English auction with a reserve price which he must…
a Suppose you are given a choice between thefollowing options:A1: Win $30 for sureA2: 80% chance of winning $45 and 20% chance ofA2: winning nothing B1: 25% chance of winning $30B2: 20% chance of winning $45Most people prefer A1 to A2 and B2 to B1. Explainwhy this behavior violates the assumption that decisionmakers maximize expected utility.b Now suppose you play the following game: You havea 75% chance of winning nothing and a 25% chance ofplaying the second stage of the game. If you reach thesecond stage, you have a choice of two options (C1 andC2), but your choice must be made now, before youreach the second stage.C1: Win $30 for sureC2: 80% chance of winning $45 13.5 Bayes’ Rule and Decision Trees 767Most people choose C1 over C2 and B2 to B1 (from part(a)). Explain why this again violates the assumption ofexpected utility maximization. Tversky and Kahneman(1981) speculate that most people are attracted to thesure $30 in the second stage, even though the secondstage may never be…
QUESTION 6 Paul is a risk loving decision maker, facing a lottery that yields either zero or 100 pounds with equal probabilities. A O a. Paul will agree to sell the lottery if and only if X> 100 Ob. Paul would never sell the lottery because he likes risk O. Paul may agree to sell the lottery for X 50
A friend offers you a chance to play a game in which there are only two outcomes, each with equal probability. If you get the "good" outcome, you win $80. But if you get the bad outcome, you only win $20. What price to play would make this a fair game (fair bet)? Carefully follow all mathematical instructions in your answer.
1. Individual Problems 18-1 You hold an oral, or English, auction among three bidders. You estimate that each bidder has a value of either $88 or $110 for the item, and you attach probabilities to each value of 50%. The winning bidder must pay a price equal to the second highest bid. The following table lists the eight possible combinations for bidder values. Each combination is equally likely to occur. On the following table, indicate the price paid by the winning bidder. Combination Number Bidder 1 Value Bidder 2 Value Bidder 3 Value Probability Price ($) ($) ($) 1 $88 $88 $88 0.125 2 $88 $88 $110 0.125 3 $88 $110 $88 0.125 4 $88 $110 $110 0.125 5 $110 $88 $88 0.125 6 $110 $88 $110 0.125 7 $110 $110 $88 0.125 8 $110 $110 $110 0.125 The expected price paid is . Suppose that bidders 1 and 2 collude and would be willing to bid up to a maximum of their values, but the two bidders…