Tit-for- Prisoner's Dilemma Game Nash Dominant Payoff Strategy Matrix tat Definition Equilibrium Strategy Collusion A strategy in which a player cooperates until the other player defects and then defects until the other player cooperates again The event that occurs when agents in a game form an agreement about which strategies to implement A case in which individually rational behavior leads to a jointly inefficient outcome A visual representation of a game showing all possible strategies for each player and all potential outcomes and payoffs

Tit-for- Prisoner's Dilemma Game Nash Dominant Payoff Strategy Matrix tat Definition Equilibrium Strategy Collusion A strategy in which a player cooperates until the other player defects and then defects until the other player cooperates again The event that occurs when agents in a game form an agreement about which strategies to implement A case in which individually rational behavior leads to a jointly inefficient outcome A visual representation of a game showing all possible strategies for each player and all potential outcomes and payoffs

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.3P

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You are playing a game with a friend. It’s yourmove but you don’t have a dominant strategy.Your payoff depends on what your friend doesafter your move. You consider flipping a coin todecide what to do. You are about to reach for acoin, but then you realize that your friend has adominant strategy. Explain how using backwardinduction (rather than a coin toss) will now determine your next move
The prisoners’ dilemma is a two-person gameillustrating thata. the cooperative outcome could be worse for bothpeople than the Nash equilibrium.b. even if the cooperative outcome is better thanthe Nash equilibrium for one person, it might beworse for the other.c. even if cooperation is better than the Nashequilibrium, each person might have an incentivenot to cooperate.d. rational, self-interested individuals will naturallyavoid the Nash equilibrium because it is worsefor both of them.
fnan421 WWord Gozden Geç r Gorunum Varc m Ne yaomak steci gnz soy evn 1) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop either TV or Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix: FIRM Y TV LAPTOP FIRM X TV 30, 30 50, 35 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 A) If both firms make their decisions at the same time and follow maximin (low-risk) strategies, what will the outcome be? B) Suppose both firms try to maximize profits, but Firm X has a head start in planning, and can commit first. Now what will the outcome be? What will the outcome be if Firm Y has a head start in planning and can commit first? I
The prisoners' dilemma is a two-person game illus·trating thata. t he cooperative outcome could be worse for bothpeople than t he Nash equilibrium.b . even if the cooperative outcome is better than theNash equilibrium for one person, it might be worsefor the other.c. even if cooperation is better than the Nash equilibrium,each person might have an incentive not tocooperate.d . rational, seff·interested individuals will naturallyavoid the Nash equilibrium because it is worse forboth of them.
In game theory, a dominant strategy is the best strategy to pick, no matter which moves are chosen by the other player. O to make the exact same move that was made by the other player. the choice that causes the payoff for the other player to be minimized, regardless of the payoff it earns the best strategy to pick, assuming the other player makes his or her best possible choice. to allocate all personnel resources towards defensive talent in order to dominate opposing offenses. 46°F
learn.canterbury.ac.nz Clasarsom Nov 15-ICO EUC LEARN | AKO See the game below and answer the questions 8 to 11: Player-1 C Player-2 X, Y Y Player-1 9 14 8. Player-2 16 17 16 Nash Equilibrium in this game: Select one: O a. Playert: C; Player2: X O b. Playert: C; Player2: Y Oc. Playert: L; Player2: X Od. Playert: L; Player2: Y e. None
Consider the following price game: Firm 1 Firm 2 High Low High 20, 20 12, 24 Low 24, 12 14, 14 Remark: In simultaneous move games (games with rows and columns) theconvention is to write the row player’s payoff first and the column player’spayoff second. (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Recall that for each playeryou should find the best response to each of the opponents’ strategies andunderline the associated payoff. Then look for a cell where both strategiesare best responses to each other. This is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)?
parameter z= 1 In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, what is the sum of the payoffs tothe two players?
There are a kicker and a goalie who confront each other in a penalty kick that willdetermine the outcome of the game. The kicker can kick the ball left or right, while the goaliecan choose to jump left or right. Because of the speed of the kick, the decisions need to bemade simultaneously. If the goalie jumps in the same direction as the kick, then the goalie winsand the kicker loses. If the goalie jumps in the opposite direction of the kick then the kickerwins and the goalie loses. Model this as a strategic form game and write down the matrix thatrepresents the game you modeled. Find the Nash equilibrium.
a. The president of a Japanese electronics company, Takashi Hashiyama, famously chose the auction housefor his company’s art collection by having representatives from two auction houses, Christie’s and Sotheby’s,play a round of rock-paper-scissors. At stake were millions of dollars in commissions. Show the payoff matrixfor a game where the payoff is 1 if you win, 0 if you tie, and -1 if you lose. I’m sure you know this already, butjust in case: rock breaks scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper smothers rock. Here’s an article about the actualgame if you’re interested. b. If you were in a high stakes game…
L 0 4 15.1 X₂ A M R 0 1 4 0 2 B L 4 0 с X3 M R 0 1 3 FIGURE 15.5 Exercise 15.1. Equilibrium Selection: Consider the extensive-form game in Figure 15.5. a. Find all the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game. b. Which of the Bayesian Nash equilibria are also perfect Bayesian equi- libria? Why?
Consider the following game: Steffi N K 14, 6 7,6 8, 7 Jim 5, 8 8, 8 13, 6 M 1,5 8, -6 6, 6 What is Jim's best response to Steffi playing P? (you can select more than one answer) V a. K O b. M O c. N O d. L V e. 14 O f. 8