The payoff matrix supplied shows outcomes of various strategies that two firms might follow in response to action on the part of the other company. This payoff matrix describes actions in developing vaccines for not-too-rare but also not-too-common diseases. Each element shows the payoffs to a set of strategies as the payoff to the domestic firm, then a comma, then the payoff to the foreign firm. Domestic firm Enter Not Enter Foreign firm Enter Not Enter -[x].-[x] [y],0 (EE) (EN) 0.[y] (NE) 0,0 (NN) Which of the outcomes in the table above are Nash equilibria? Select all that apply

The payoff matrix supplied shows outcomes of various strategies that two firms might follow in response to action on the part of the other company. This payoff matrix describes actions in developing vaccines for not-too-rare but also not-too-common diseases. Each element shows the payoffs to a set of strategies as the payoff to the domestic firm, then a comma, then the payoff to the foreign firm. Domestic firm Enter Not Enter Foreign firm Enter Not Enter -[x].-[x] [y],0 (EE) (EN) 0.[y] (NE) 0,0 (NN) Which of the outcomes in the table above are Nash equilibria? Select all that apply

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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