Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity Price Total Revenue and Total (Gallons) (Dollars per gallon) Profit (Dollars) 36 33 30 27 24 40 1,320 2,400 3,240 3,840 4,200 4,320 4,200 3,840 3,240 2,400 1,320 80 120 160 200 21 240 18 280 15 320 12 360 9. 400 6. 3 440 480 Refer to Table 17-1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Celia and Venya from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Celia and Venya reach a Nash equilibrium? O a. $12 O b. $15 O. $9 O d. $18

Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity Price Total Revenue and Total (Gallons) (Dollars per gallon) Profit (Dollars) 36 33 30 27 24 40 1,320 2,400 3,240 3,840 4,200 4,320 4,200 3,840 3,240 2,400 1,320 80 120 160 200 21 240 18 280 15 320 12 360 9. 400 6. 3 440 480 Refer to Table 17-1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Celia and Venya from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Celia and Venya reach a Nash equilibrium? O a. $12 O b. $15 O. $9 O d. $18

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity (Gallons) 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 Price (Dollars per gallon) 36 33 c. 0 gallons d. 240 gallons 30 27 24 21 18 15 12 9630 Total Revenue and Total Profit (Dollars) 0 1,3201 2,400 3,240 3,840 4,200 4,320 4,200 3,840 3,240 2,400 1,320 0 Refer to Table 17-1. What is the socially efficient quantity of water? Ⓒa. 280 gallons b. 480 gallons
Table 17-1Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Quantity(in gallons) Price Total Revenue(and Total Profit) 0 $60 $0 100 55 5,500 200 50 10,000 300 45 13,500 400 40 16,000 500 35 17,500 600 30 18,000 700 25 17,500 800 20 16,000 900 15 13,500 1,000 10 10,000 1,100 5 5,500 1,200 0 0 Refer to Table 17-1. If this market for water were perfectly competitive instead of…
Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity (Gallons) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 Table 17-1 Price Refer to Table 17-1. What is the socially efficient quantity of water? Ca. 600 gallons Ob. 900 gallons Oc. 1,200 gallons Od. 0 gallons (Dollars per gallon) 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Total Revenue and Total Profit (Dollars) 0 5,500 10,000 13,500 16,000 17,500 18,000 17,500 16,000 13,500 10,000 5,500 0
Imagine a small town, in which only two residents, Tony and Jill, own wells that produce water for safe drinking. Each Saturday, Tony and Jill work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, bring the water to town, and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Meanwhile, suppose that it costs $1/gallon for Tony &Jill to pump & deliver water to the customer: i.e., the marginal cost, MC = $1. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is reflected in the table below. Note: Price (P) is a function of the weekly market quantity (Q): i.e., P = 13 – 0.1 Q Total Marginal Total Marginal Cost Revenue Revenue Quantity (Q) Price Cost Profit (P) (TR) (MR) (TC) (MC) (TT) 13 N.A N.A 10 12 120 12 10 1 110 20 11 220 10 20 1 200 30 10 300 1 40 1 50 8 60 7 70 6 1 80 1 90 4 1 100 3 1 110 220 1 120 1 120 1 130 -12 130 1 -130 (1) Complete the above table by filling all blanks. (2) As long as Tony and Jill operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly, what will the…
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Table 17-5. Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero.The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below. WeeklyQuantity(in gallons) Price WeeklyTotal Revenue(and Total Profit) 0 $12 $ 0 25 11 275 50 10 500 75 9 675 100 8 800 125 7 875 150 6 900 175 5 875 200 4 800 225 3 675 250 2 500 275 1 275 300 0 0 Refer to Table 17-5. Since Kunal and Naj operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, what price will they charge for water? Group of answer choices…
Suppose that a small company is thinking of putting plants in their lobby for employees to view and enjoy. Since the plants are to be viewed by employees, the plants are non-excludable (it is infeasible to move a plant each time a specific individual walks by) and non-rival in consumption (if one worker looks at the plant, it does not prevent another from doing so as well). The company employs three workers: Robin, Alex, and Sharon. The company is thinking about buying up to three plants, and wants to know how much workers would enjoy each plant. For Robin, the first plant has a benefit of $47 per day, the second plant has a benefit of $37 per day, and the third plant has a benefit of $13 per day. For Alex, the first plant has a benefit of $41 per day, the second has a benefit of $28 per day, and the third has a benefit of $6 per day. For Sharon, the first plant has a benefit of $31 per day, the second has a benefit of $19 per day, and the third has a benefit of $2 per day. Given that…
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