Select one or more: O a. A Pareto efficient outcome is where you cannot make anyone better off without someone else ending up worse off. Ob. All are happy with their share of income in a Pareto efficient outcome. O C. There is only ever one Pareto efficient outcome. d. If two people have £100 to split, any split in which all the money is used up is Pareto-Efficient, even if one person gets none.

Select one or more: O a. A Pareto efficient outcome is where you cannot make anyone better off without someone else ending up worse off. Ob. All are happy with their share of income in a Pareto efficient outcome. O C. There is only ever one Pareto efficient outcome. d. If two people have £100 to split, any split in which all the money is used up is Pareto-Efficient, even if one person gets none.

Macroeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617390

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter1: What Economics Is About

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19QP

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