Question D2. An Aggressor country is threatening to attack another victim country. The victim countryhas allies who will come to their defence if they are attacked, however, the amount of troops the allysends can be either small or large. The victim knows how many troops will be sent but the aggressordoes not, the aggressor believes the probability the force is large is p. The game faced by the countriesis depicted below.Victim "Large force"DefendCapitulateAggressorAttack(-50,-20)(100,-50)Don't Attack(0,-10)(0,0)Victim "Small force"DefendCapitulateAggressorAttack(50,-80)(100,-50)Don't Attack(0,-10)(0,0)a) Define what it means for a game to have incomplete information and explain how a game withunknown payoffs can be thought of as such a game.b) Write down a combined payoff matrix that includes strategies for the victim that are conditionalon their type and use this to work out the Bayesian-Nash Equilibria for this game.

When players lack complete knowledge of critical elements, such as the payoffs or types of their…

Question D2. An Aggressor country is threatening to attack another victim country. The victim country has allies who will come to their defence if they are attacked, however, the amount of troops the ally sends can be either small or large. The victim knows how many troops will be sent but the aggressor does not, the aggressor believes the probability the force is large is p. The game faced by the countries is depicted below. Victim "Large force"

Question D2. An Aggressor country is threatening to attack another victim country. The victim country has allies who will come to their defence if they are attacked, however, the amount of troops the ally sends can be either small or large. The victim knows how many troops will be sent but the aggressor does not, the aggressor believes the probability the force is large is p. The game faced by the countries is depicted below. Victim "Large force"

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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