Metropolitan Utilities District currently charges residents in Omaha $1.23 per cubic feet of water use for each home's first 900 cubic feet of water used, $1.73 per cubic feet of water use for each home's usage rate between 900 and 3,000 cubic feet, and $2.22 per cubic feet of water use for anything over 3,000 cubic feet of use. The pricing structure is an example of: over-use and inefficient pricing. too few water permits being traded on the local water market. block pricing. conservation pricing.

Metropolitan Utilities District currently charges residents in Omaha $1.23 per cubic feet of water use for each home's first 900 cubic feet of water used, $1.73 per cubic feet of water use for each home's usage rate between 900 and 3,000 cubic feet, and $2.22 per cubic feet of water use for anything over 3,000 cubic feet of use. The pricing structure is an example of: over-use and inefficient pricing. too few water permits being traded on the local water market. block pricing. conservation pricing.

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter13: Positive Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 23P: HighFlyer Airlines wants to build new airplanes with greatly increased cabin space. This will allow...

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