Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p=140-2q. where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p=120-2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original deal? How much more would the club make if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices? The club maximizes profit subject to the policy by charging a per round price of and a lump-sum fee of (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) p= F=$.

Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p=140-2q. where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p=120-2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original deal? How much more would the club make if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices? The club maximizes profit subject to the policy by charging a per round price of and a lump-sum fee of (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) p= F=$.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p = 120 - 2g, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p = 100 - 2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's…
Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p = 120-2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $40, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? The profit-maximizing membership fee (F) is $ . (Enter your response as a whole number.)
Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p = 120 - 2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the club earn by using two-part pricing?
Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p=200-2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? The profit-maximizing membership fee (F) is $. (Enter your response as a whole number.)
Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p= 200 - 2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $40, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? The profit-maximizing membership fee (F) is $ 6400 . (Enter your response as a whole number.) The Club's extra profit (above what its profit would have been from charging a single per-round price) is $ (Enter your response as a whole number.)
Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p=140-2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p=120-2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original deal?…
Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p = 140-2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $40, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. The manager believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is p = 120-2q. The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original…
Joe has moved to a small town with only one golf course. His demand curve is P = 120 – 2Q where Q is the number of rounds of golf he plays per year. The manager of the golf course offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds of golf as he wants to at $20 per round. The golf course’s Marginal Cost is $20. - If the golf course wishes to implement a two-part pricing model, what membership fee will maximize revenue for the golf course? Please show your calculations. - How many rounds of golf will Joe play per year (calculate the value of Q*)? Please explain. - Would someone who just occasionally plays golf (perhaps 1 or 2 rounds once every 2 months) prefer two-part pricing as given above, or would they prefer to pay a price of $100 per round without any membership fee? Please explain.
Tuan lives in a town with only one movie rental store. Suppose Tuan's demand for movie rentals per month is Q = 16 - 2P. The movie store currently charges $5 per movie but is thinking of adding a flat monthly cardholder fee and dropping the price to $2 per rental. At this new price, what is the largest cardholder fee that Tuan will pay? If the rental store has a constant marginal cost of $2, which strategy is more profitable?
GameZone, a video games store, is considering the best way to price two new games – a first-person shooter (FPS) and a racing game. There are four types of consumers that might buy the games with roughly equal numbers of each type, and their willingness to pay (WTP) for each game is detailed in the table below (assume that the willingness-to-pay for a second game of the same type is zero). How should Gamezone price the two games separately to maximise revenue? How should Gamezone price a bundle of both games to maximise revenue? Is there an alternative (involving bundling) that generates more revenue than either single prices or a bundle alone? Under what condition/s is bundling likely to increase profits for a firm? Consumer Type WTP for FPS game WTP for racing game A $120 $70 B $70 $120 C $160 $10 D $10 $160
AT&T. It is early in the days of cellular (or mobile) telephony, and you are the price manager for AT&T's cell phone plan. It has been determined that there are two market segments: low-value consumers and high-value consumers. For simplicity, assume that all consumers within a segment are identical. A consumer in the low-value segment has monthly demand (measured in number of minutes) of Q, (p) = 80 - p, and a consumer in the high-value segment has monthly demand of QH (P) = 100 -p, where p is in cents per minute. a. Assume AT&T charges a flat price per minute with no membership fee. Derive the expression for consumer surplus for a low-value consumer and for a high-value consumer as a function of the price, p. Low-value consumer surplus, CS, (p): = High-value consumer surplus, CS, (p) = Show Transcribed Text Assume AT&T's marginal cost is a constant 10 cents per minute. You have decided to use a two-part tariff and must choose the monthly fixed fee f and the per-minute charge p. There…
Sam is a personal trainer working for private clients. He just moved from California to a city on the East Coast and he needs to create his newclient base. A colleague told him that on the East Coast personal trainers face an inverse demand P = 300 – 20Q, that is when working with Qclients, a personal trainer can find one more client willing to pay P = 300 – 20Q for a weekly training session. Sam’s opportunity cost of a twohour training session is MC = 10Q. We make the heroic assumption that clients are infinitely divisible so that we can use calculus to solveSam’s profit maximizing problems.At first, Sam doesn’t read East Coasters that well and he can’t tell who is willing to pay more money for training sessions. Hence, he chargesall clients the same price.a) In part naively in part to get to know more people, Sam decides to sign up any customer willing to pay a price at least as high as his marginalcost of time. That is, Sam behaves like a price-taker. How many clients does he…