Q3 Question 3Consider a hypothetical conflict between countries R and U, involving a thirdcountry A. Country R has two strategies at its deposal, namely,(i) War(ii) Negotiation (Neg.).(3.1)orLikewise, country U also has two strategies at its deposal, namely ,(i) Waror( ii) Negotiation (Neg.).(3.2)Finally, country A has two strategies at its deposal, namely,(i)Providing Assistance to Country U (Assist. ),or (ii)Staying Neutral ( Neutral ).(3.3)The payoff table for country R is given by( War, Assist. ) ( War, Neutral ) ( Neg. , Assist. ) ( Neg., Neutral )War– 10+ 5+ 8+ 10Neg.- 5+ 2In the above table, inside the round brackets( XXX , YYY ),XXX represents the strategy applied by country U [refer to (3.2) ], and YYYrepresents the strategy applied by country A [refer to ( 3.3)].The payoff table for country U is given by( War, Assist. ) ( War, Neutral ) ( Neg. , Assist. ) ( Neg. , Neutral)War- 10- 20+ 3- 5Neg.- 20- 30+ 1- 2In the above table, inside the round brackets( UUU , VVV ),UUU represents the strategy applied by country R [refer to (3.1) ], and VVVrepresents the strategy applied by country A [refer to (3.3) ]. The payoff table for country A is given by( War, War ) ( War , Neg. ) ( Neg. , War ) ( Neg., Neg. )Assist.+ 5+ 2+ 2Neutral- 5- 3In the above table, inside the round brackets( AAA , BBB ),AAA represents the strategy applied by country R [refer to (3.1) ], and BBBrepresents the strategy applied by country U [ refer to ( 3.2)].Does the game has any Nash equilibrium ? If your answer is "Yes", then you arerequired to identify all the Nash equilibrium ( equilibria ). Justify you answer.

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Answered: Does the game has any Nash equilibrium…

Does the game has any Nash equilibrium ? If your answer is "Yes", then you are required to identify all the Nash equilibrium ( equilibria). Justify you answer.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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