Consider two firms with differentiated products, whose demand functions are given by 41 = 2 – 2pı + P2, and 42 = 2 – 2p2 + P1, where q; and p; are their quantities and prices. Their constant marginal costs are given by: c and c2. Assume that c2 = 1 is known to both firms, but c1 is known only to firm 1. Firm 2 knows that c can be either 1.2, or .8, with equal probabilities. The firms compete in prices in a simultaneous move game. (i) Find the equilibrium prices, (ii) explain what happens if private information can be revealed costlessly.
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- Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Thus the marginal and average cost for each firm is €40. Assume the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 - Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. The price charged by each firm in the Cournot equilbrium is O A. C80 O B. €40 OC. €60 O D. C752. Suppose the home country open up to free trade and a foreign competitor enters the market. Assume thatthe foreign firm has the same cost structure as the home firm (the monopoly from the previous question). The demand for its product is given by the inverse demand function: P = 120 −QD. The company’s costs are: T C = 20Q+ 200 and MC = $20A) Derive the best response function for each firm (h-home and f-foreign)B) Find each firms’ output, the home market price, and each firms’ profit from the home market3. Now, suppose that in addition to the home country opening up to free trade, the foreign country has alsoopened up to free trade. As a result, both firms sell their product in both markets.A) Find each firms’ overall output, market price in each market, and each firms’ overall profitB) Explain what effect free trade has (relative to no trade) on the firms and consumersPizza Hut and Dominoís are considering to open a shop in a new shopping precinct in Burwood. Suppose both charge $10 for a pizza (price competition is ignored here), and the aggregate local demand for pizza at this price is Q: If both Örms open a shop in the shopping precinct, Q is shared equally between the two shops. On the other hand, if there is only one pizza shop in the shopping precinct, the total demand Q goes to that shop. The total cost function for Pizza Hut is TC P(Q) = 5Q + 6000 and the total cost function for Dominos is TCD(Q) = 5Q+ 6000: Each has two strategies: Open a shop or Not, and they make their decisions simultaneously. The payoff is zero for a firm that does not open a shop in the shopping precinct. Suppose Q= 3000: Construct a 2 X 2 payoff matrix for this entry game between Pizza Hut and Dominoís and Önd the NE of the game. Suppose Q = 2000:Construct a 2x2 payoff matrix for this entry game between Pizza Hut and Dominoís and Önd the NE of the game.…
- Consider a duopoly market with 2 firms. Aggregate demand in this market is given byt Q = 500 – P, where P is the price on the market. Q is total market output, i.e., Q = QA + QB, where QA is the output by Firm A and QB is the output by Firm B. For both firms, marginal cost is given by MC = 20, i=A,B. « Assume the firms compete a la Cournot. e a) Find the inverse demand in this market. Note that marginal revenue for both firms is given by MRA=500-2QA-QB, MRB=500-QA-2QB. b) Describe what a best-response curve is and how to find it. c) Derive the best-response function for each firm. d) What are the equilibrium quantities? e) What is the total quantity supplied on this market? f) What is the equilibrium price in this market?11 8. Suppose an industry produces an undifferentiated product for which market demand is given by X = A- P. There are many potential producers for this product, each of whom has a production function of the form: Fixed costs of F must be paid for being in business, and the marginal cost of a unit of production is a constant k . We imagine that firms decide whether to enter the industry under the supposition that, after all the firms that are going to enter do so, competition will be according to the Cournot model. That is, if N firms are in the market each has Cournot conjectures. An equilibrium is achieved with N firms in the industry if each firm, having its Cournot conjectures, does no worse than break even, whereas if another firm entered and made this an N + 1 firm Cournot oligopoly, all the firms would lose money. What is the equilibrium in this case? What (if anything) would be…A6 In Changlun, Kedah, there are two bakers, Abu and Bakar. Their bread taste the same and nobody can tell the difference. Abu has constant marginal costs of RM1 per loaf of bread. Bakar has constant marginal costs of RM2 per loaf. Fixed costs are zero for both of them. The inverse demand function for bread in Changlun is p(q) = 6 – 0.01(qA + qB), where q is the total number of loaves sold per day. Find the reaction function for Abu and Bakar. What is the Cournot Nash equilibrium number of loaves of bread for each baker?
- Assuming you are the managing director of a firm that produces three goods: A, Band C. The price elasticity of demand for A is 1.2, for B it is 1.00 and for C it is 0.75.It is known that he firm is experiencing serious cash flow problems and you have toincrease total revenue as soon as possible. If you were in a position to set the pricesfor these goods, what would be your pricing strategy for each product2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 1 2 q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5-p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 1 2. (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…usiness EconomicsQ&A LibraryTwo firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms. Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity). Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999]. Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models: (a) Cournot Model Two firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB = Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in…
- PleaseFor example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Full Coop advertises and Lucky Bird does not advertise, Full Coop will make a profit of $14 million, and Lucky Bird will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Lucky Bird and Full Coop are both profit- maximizing firms. If Lucky Bird chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ advertise. million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of $ million if Full Coop does not If Lucky Bird chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ not advertise. million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of $ million if Full Coop does S If Full Coop advertises, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses If Full Coop doesn't advertise, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose not to advertise. O Lucky Bird will choose not to…Water taken from the public water supply and put in bottles would seem to be a homogeneous good. Yet Coke and Pepsi have spent large amounts on advertising to convince consumers that their bottled water products, Dasani and Aquafina, are highly distinctive. Why would these firms undertake such expenditures if the bottled water market is a Bertrand market? Coke and Pepsi advertise their bottled water to OA differentiate their produats. O B. promote ease of entry. OC. increase economic efficiency. O D. reduce average fixed costs. .O E. generate economies of scale.