Consider two firms choosing quantities sequentially in a duopoly setting (i.e. the Stackelberg game). The two firms have identical products. Each firm has no fixed costs, and faces marginal costs equal to 5 plus the quantity it produces (i.e. MC = 5 + q). Market demand is given by Q = 46 - P, where Q is market quantity and P is market price. In equilibrium, how much will the firm that moves first produce?
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Consider two firms choosing quantities sequentially in a duopoly setting (i.e. the Stackelberg game). The two firms have identical products. Each firm has no fixed costs, and faces marginal costs equal to 5 plus the quantity it produces (i.e. MC = 5 + q). Market demand is given by Q = 46 - P, where Q is market quantity and P is market price. In equilibrium, how much will the firm that moves first produce?
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- Consider a market for crude oil production. There are two firms in the market. The marginal cost of firm 1 is 20, while that of firm 2 is 20. The marginal cost is assumed to be constant. The inverse demand for crude oil is P(Q)=200-Q, where Q is the total production in the market. These two firms are engaging in Cournot competition. Find the production quantity of firm 1 in Nash equilibrium. If necessary, round off two decimal places and answer up to one decimal place.Three firms compete in the style of Cournot. The inverse demand is P(Q) = a - Q. Scenario 1: All three firms have the same constant marginal cost MC = c. Scenario 2: Firm 1 has MC = 0.5c, Firm 2 has MC = c, and Firm 3 has MC = 1.5c. Assume that a > 3c. Which of the following is correct? (Price means the price in Nash equilibrium.) Price in scenario 1 > Price in scenario 2 Price in scenario 2 > Price in scenario 1 Price in scenario 1 = Price in scenario 2 Any of the first three options is possible depending on the value of a Any of the first three options is possible depending on the value of a and c.Consider an industry with two identical firms (denoted firm 1 and 2) producing a homogenous good. Firms compete in quantities. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 20. Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 80. Demand in the industry is given by D(p) = 380 - p. Let q1 and 92 denote the quantities of firm 1 and 2, respectively. Derive the Nash equilibrium in quantities. What is the total production in this industry?
- Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are Q, = 20 - P, +P2 and Q2 = 20 + P1 - P2. where P, and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Q, and Q2 are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.) Each firm will charge a price of $ (Enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.) Each firm will produce units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price, What price will each firm charge, how much will each sell, and what…Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are and Q₂ =20+P₁-P2₁ where P₁ and P₂ are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Q₁ and Q₂ are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.) Each firm will charge a price of $1. (Enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.) Each firm will produce units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will each sell, and what will be profits?…Consider a Stackelberg duopoly:There are two firms in an industry with demand Q = 1 − Pd.The “leader” chooses a quantity qL to produce. The “follower” observes qL and chooses a quantity qF.Suppose now that the cost function is Ci(qi) = qi2 for i = L, F. (a) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium. (b) Compare the equilibrium you found with the Nash equilibrium if the game was simultaneous (i.e., Cournot competition). Is the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game also a Nash equilibrium of the sequential game? Why or why not?
- Consider two firms, referred to as firms 1 and 2, who compete in a market by choosing quantities produced and face the following inverse demand: P(Q) 10-20 Each firm has a marginal cost of production of $4.00. Suppose these firms collude by agreeing to produce quantities to maximize their joint profits. Firm 1 sticks to the agreement, but firm 2 does not. If firm 2 can secretly change its produced quantity, how much would it produce?Two firms, A and B, sell the same good X in a market with total demand Q = 100 – P. The two firms compete on quantities and decides how much to produce simultaneously. Firm A cost function is C(qA) = 40qA. Firm B cost function is C(qB) = 60qB. 1. Find the best reply functions of both firms and represent them in a graph. 2. Find the quantity produced by each firm in a Nash equilibrium. 3. Find the firms and consumers surplus. 4. Compare the surplus of firms found above with the surplus arising when both firm cooperate to sustain a monopoly outcome. 5. Assume now that A and B compete as in a Stackelberg model. A chooses first and B chooses after observing the choice of A. Find equilibrium quantities produced by each firm and the market equilibrium price.Two firms produce and sell differentiated products that are substitutes for each other. Their demand curves are Firm 1: Q₁ = 40-3P₁+ P2 1 Firm 2: Q₂ = 40 -3P 2+P1 Both firms have constant marginal costs of $4.70 per unit. Both firms set their own price and take their competitor's price as fixed. Use the Nash equilibrium concept to determine the equilibrium set of prices. Since the firms are identical, they will set the same prices and produce the same quantities. In equilibrium, each firm will charge a price of $ and produce units of output. (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Each firm will earn a profit of $ (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.)
- Consider a duopolistic market with two firms, A and B, facing a market demand curve of P=100-qA –qB for the same product. Assume that the cost of production is CA=2qA for firm A and CB=4qB for firm B. Suppose that both firms make output decision simultaneously. In Nash equilibrium, the firm A should produce unit, and its profit is In Nash equilibrium, the firm B should produce unit, and its profit is .Two firms - firm 1 and firm 2 - share a market for a specific product. Both have zero marginal cost. They compete in the manner of Bertrand and the market demand for the product is given by: q = 20 − min{p1, p2}. 1. What are the equilibrium prices and profits? 2. Suppose the two firms have signed a collusion contract, that is, they agree to set the same price and share the market equally. What is the price they would set and what would be their profits? For the following parts, suppose the Bertrand game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both firms δ ∈ [0, 1). 3. Let both players adopt the following strategy: start with collusion; maintain the collusive price as long as no one has ever deviated before; otherwise set the Bertrand price. What is the minimum value of δ for which this is a SPNE. 4. Suppose the policy maker has imposed a price floor p = 4, that is, neither firm is allowed to set a price below $4. How does your answer to part 3 change? Is it now…1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.