Consider two Cournot oligopolists, firm 1 and firm 2, in a homogenous product market. The market demand is P = 100 - 3Q and each firm has a constant marginal cost MC=10. The market price of equilibrium and total quantity in the market is: Select one: a. P* 30 and Q* = 20 O b. P* 40 and Q* = 20 ○ c. P* = 40 and Q* = 30 O d. P*20 and Q* = 30

Consider two Cournot oligopolists, firm 1 and firm 2, in a homogenous product market. The market demand is P = 100 - 3Q and each firm has a constant marginal cost MC=10. The market price of equilibrium and total quantity in the market is: Select one: a. P* 30 and Q* = 20 O b. P* 40 and Q* = 20 ○ c. P* = 40 and Q* = 30 O d. P20 and Q = 30

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11SQP

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