. Consider a marriage market with three men and three women, all of whom prefer any match to being unmatched. Preferences over matches are as follows: m₁w₁ W2 > W3 m₂ : W₁ W2 > W3 m3 w2w3 > W₁ (a) Find a stable matching. w₁m1 m2 > m3 W₂ m₂ > m₁ > M3 w3m₁ m2 > m3 (b) Is there a matching that is Pareto efficient but not stable?

. Consider a marriage market with three men and three women, all of whom prefer any match to being unmatched. Preferences over matches are as follows: m₁w₁ W2 > W3 m₂ : W₁ W2 > W3 m3 w2w3 > W₁ (a) Find a stable matching. w₁m1 m2 > m3 W₂ m₂ > m₁ > M3 w3m₁ m2 > m3 (b) Is there a matching that is Pareto efficient but not stable?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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