Consider a market with an inverse demand Function p = 60-4*Q. There are two firms, an incumbent and an entrant. There is a constant variable cost of 6 and a unit capacity cost of 6. In the first stage, the incumbent chooses capacity. In the second stage, the entrant decides whether or not to enter and all active firms choose quantities (where the entrant also has to simultaneously choose its capacity in the second stage, if it enters). a. For a capacity of 5 units, what is the best response function of the incumbent in the second period? b. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the second stage if the incumbent chose a capacity of 5 units in the first stage conditional on the entrant entering? c. For a capacity of an arbitrary k units, what is the best response function of the incumbent? d. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the second stage if the incumbent chose a capacity of k units in the first stage conditional on the entrant entering? e. Solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game when the entry costs are 25. f. Solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game when the entry costs are 64.

Consider a market with an inverse demand Function p = 60-4*Q. There are two firms, an incumbent and an entrant. There is a constant variable cost of 6 and a unit capacity cost of 6. In the first stage, the incumbent chooses capacity. In the second stage, the entrant decides whether or not to enter and all active firms choose quantities (where the entrant also has to simultaneously choose its capacity in the second stage, if it enters). a. For a capacity of 5 units, what is the best response function of the incumbent in the second period? b. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the second stage if the incumbent chose a capacity of 5 units in the first stage conditional on the entrant entering? c. For a capacity of an arbitrary k units, what is the best response function of the incumbent? d. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the second stage if the incumbent chose a capacity of k units in the first stage conditional on the entrant entering? e. Solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game when the entry costs are 25. f. Solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game when the entry costs are 64.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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