Consider a market for a homogeneous product with aggregate demand equal to p(Q)=65-6Q, where Q denotes the aggregate quantity put in the market by all the competitors. All the firms have access to the same technology and can produce at a total cost equal to C(q)=9+7q. There is one leader firm, firm 1, which sets in quantity in advance of the rest of the firms. The rest of the firms (followers) decided together after firm 1's quantity is known. How many follower firms (obtaining positive profits) can the market accommodate? [Write your answer as an integer number rounding down; e.g. 5,8 firms rounds to 5 firms.]

Consider a market for a homogeneous product with aggregate demand equal to p(Q)=65-6Q, where Q denotes the aggregate quantity put in the market by all the competitors. All the firms have access to the same technology and can produce at a total cost equal to C(q)=9+7q. There is one leader firm, firm 1, which sets in quantity in advance of the rest of the firms. The rest of the firms (followers) decided together after firm 1's quantity is known. How many follower firms (obtaining positive profits) can the market accommodate? [Write your answer as an integer number rounding down; e.g. 5,8 firms rounds to 5 firms.]

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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