Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction in which bidders valuations are independently and identically distributed according to the Uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Explain what the rules of the First Price Sealed bid auction are. Set it up as a Bayesian game. Compute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the two bidder case.
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- A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0,100].There are several possible ideas to design the auction. a) The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the sameroom; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0, and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p (the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned and the two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer. (b) Both bidders are invited to submit their bids covertly (bids are non-negative real numbers).…There are three bidders participating in a first-price auction for a painting. Each bidder has a private, independent value vi for such a painting that is drawn uniformly from [0,1] Assume that each bidder i has a linear bidding function bi=avi, where a>0. What is the bidding strategy of bidder i , namely bi in the Bayesian equilibrium?A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0,100].There are several possible ideas to design the auction. The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the same room; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0, and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p (the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned andthe two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer.
- Consider the two period Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game where each player is interested in the SUM of the payoffs she gets in each period. Players see the outcome after the play in each period. (The period payoffs are 10,5,1,0.) (i) Write out this game in its strategic form. (ii) Find all Nash equilibria and all Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria.In the following symmetric general sum game (2, 2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (2, 2) (0,0) (2,2) (0,0) (i) Find all pure Nash equilibria. (ii) Find all mixed Nash equilibria in which all probabilities are positive. (vi) Which of these are evolutionary stable strategies?Q2 Consider the following game. (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. 2, 4 6, 0 5,1 1,9 A В
- For the game given, solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.Suppose two bidders compete for a single indivisible item (e.g., a used car, a piece of art, etc.). We assume that bidder 1 values the item at $v1, and bidder 2 values the item at $v2. We assume that v1 > v2. In this problem we study a second price auction, which proceeds as follows. Each player i = 1, 2 simultaneously chooses a bid bi ≥ 0. The higher of the two bidders wins, and pays the second highest bid (in this case, the other player’s bid). In case of a tie, suppose the item goes to bidder 1. If a bidder does not win, their payoff is zero; if the bidder wins, their payoff is their value minus the second highest bid. a) Now suppose that player 1 bids b1 = v2 and player 2 bids b2 = v1, i.e., they both bid the value of the other player. (Note that in this case, player 2 is bidding above their value!) Show that this is a pure NE of the second price auction. (Note that in this pure NE the player with the lower value wins, while in the weak dominant strategy equilibrium where both…4. Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction in which the bidders’ valuations are independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Suppose that each bidder uses a strategy of b(vi) = avi. What is the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game when there are n bidders?
- • (1,0) (1,1) Player 2 G D H (2,0) Action Player 1 Player 1 Action B Player 1 (3,-1) E Player 2 (0,1) (-1,-1) (a) Find all the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria in this game. (b) Find all the Nash equilibria in this game. (Hint: write the game in strategic form.)Game Theory Consider the entry game with incomplete information studied in class. An incumbent politician's cost of campaigning can be high or low and the entrant does not know this cost (but the incumbent does). In class, we found two pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria in this game. Assume that the probability that the cost of campaigning is high is a parameter p, 0 < p < 1. Show that when p is large enough, there is only one pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. What is it? What is the intuition? How large does p have to be? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.Two firms bid for a contract to build a university building. Their construction costs are independent and uniformly drawn from [0,1]: Both bidders submit their bids si- multaneously. The winner is the bidder who submits a lowest bid. Tie-breaking rule is random. This kind of bidding game is called i'reverse auction' because the bidders bid for the right to provide a service and the winner is paid for the service. The FCC in 2017 has adopted similar auctions designed to repurpose spectrum for new uses. (a) In the first auction, the winner gets paid the loser's bid. For example, if the winner's cost is 0.5, his bid is 0.56, and the loserís bid is 0.6, then the winner gets the contract and the university pays the winner 0.6. The winner's net profit from the contract is 0.6-0.5 = 0.1. Solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this auction. What is the equilibrium bid of a firm bid if his cost is actually 0.5? (b) In the second auction, the winner gets paid the his/her own winning…