Consider 5 bidders whose values are independently and uniformly distributed over [0, 900] (a) For a buyer with value 100, what is his equilibrium bid in a first-price auction (FPA)?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter18: Auctions
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Consider 5 bidders whose values are independently
and uniformly distributed over [0, 900]
(a) For a buyer with value 100, what is his equilibrium
bid in a first-price auction (FPA)?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider 5 bidders whose values are independently and uniformly distributed over [0, 900] (a) For a buyer with value 100, what is his equilibrium bid in a first-price auction (FPA)?
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