Explains it correctly Three firms are bidding for the rights to provide cable television services. Thedemand for cable television is given by the equation P=100-Q. Firm 1 has an averagecost of AC¹ =10, Firm 2 has an average cost of AC2= 20, and Firm 3 has an averagecost of AC3 =30. If the rights are awarded using an English auction, approximatelywhat is the resulting price and quantity of services provided?A. P= 10; Q = 90.B. P = 20; Q = 80.C. P = 30; Q = 70.D. P= 20; Q = 90.E. P= 10; Q = 80.

Demand function : P = 100 - Q Firm 1 AC : AC1 = 10 Total Cost = 10 Q Firm 2 AC : AC 2 = 20 TC =…

Bidding for the rights to provide cable television services. The demand for cable television is given by the equation P - 100 -Q. Firm 1 has an average cost of AC! 10, Firm 2 has an average cost of AC? = 20, and Firm 3 has an average cost of ACS = 30. If the rights are awarded using an English auction, approximately what is the resulting price and quantity of services provided? A. P= 10; Q = 90. B. P= 20; Q = 80. C. P= 30; Q = 70. D. P= 20; Q = 90.

Bidding for the rights to provide cable television services. The demand for cable television is given by the equation P - 100 -Q. Firm 1 has an average cost of AC! 10, Firm 2 has an average cost of AC? = 20, and Firm 3 has an average cost of ACS = 30. If the rights are awarded using an English auction, approximately what is the resulting price and quantity of services provided? A. P= 10; Q = 90. B. P= 20; Q = 80. C. P= 30; Q = 70. D. P= 20; Q = 90.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1.1CE

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