Answer the following considering the game represented in extensive form (game tree) above: i. Player 1 has 2 information set(s) and Player 2 has 1 information set(s). (Recall: An information set can contain one or more decision nodes.) ii. There is (are) ♦ proper subgame(s) in this game (Recall: A proper subgame is a subgame other than the whole game itself.)

Answer the following considering the game represented in extensive form (game tree) above: i. Player 1 has 2 information set(s) and Player 2 has 1 information set(s). (Recall: An information set can contain one or more decision nodes.) ii. There is (are) ♦ proper subgame(s) in this game (Recall: A proper subgame is a subgame other than the whole game itself.)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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Game theory Consider a simultaneous move game with two players. Player 1 has three possible actions (A, B, or C) and Player 2 has two possible actions (D or E.) In the payoff matrix below, each cell contains the payoff for Player 1 followed by the payoff for Player 2. Player 2 7. Player 1 A B C D -3, -3 0, -11 -4, 3 -11, E 0 -7, -7 -12, 0 (a) Identify any dominated strategies in this game. If there are none, state this clearly. (b) Identify any pure strategy Nash Equilibria in this game. If there are none, state this clearly
Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S. Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw this extensive form game. (v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c = 1/2 and c = 3/2.
5. The following problem was first considered by John von Neumann and is a fundamentalresult game theory.A and B play the following game:A writes down either number 1 or number 2, and B must guess which one.If the number that A has written down is i and B has guessed correctly, B receives i units from A.If B makes a wrong guess, B pays 4/5 of a unit to A.First we consider the expected gain of player B.Suppose B guesses 1 with probability p and 2 with probability 1 −p.Let X1 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 1.Let X2 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 2.(a) Find the pmf of X1 and X2(b) Find B’s expected gain for these two cases, E[X1] and E[X2].(c) What value of p maximizes the minimum possible value of B’s expected gain?Now consider the expected loss of player ASuppose that A writes down 1 with probability q and 2 with probability 1 −q.Let Y1 be A’s loss (or gain) if B chooses number 1.Let Y2 be A’s loss (or gain) if B…
rock paper scissors гock 0. -3 1 рарer 1. -1 scissors -1 3 0. (a) Show that xT= ( ) and yT= (3) together are not a Nash equilibrium 3 3 313 for this modified game. (b) Formulate a linear program that can be used to calculate a mixed strategy x € A(R) that maximises Rosemary's security level for this modified game. (c) Solve your linear program using the 2-phase simplex algorithm. You should use the format given in lectures. Give a mixed strategy x E A(R) that has an optimal security level for Rosemary and a mixed strategy y E A(C) that has an optimal security level for Colin.
rock paper scissors rock 0. -3 0. раper scissors -1 -1 3. 0. (a) Show that xT= (,) and yT= (,) together are not a Nash equilibrium 3' 3 3131 for this modified game.
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