A tax on healthy people. Consider the basic Rothschild-Stiglitz model with asymmetric information and robust and frail customers. a. Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer. b. Will a separating equilibrium be possible if the tax τ > 0, is imposed on all customers in both sick and healthy states? Again, support your answer graphically.
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5. A tax on healthy people. Consider the basic Rothschild-Stiglitz model with asymmetric information and robust and frail customers.
a. Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer.
b. Will a separating equilibrium be possible if the tax τ > 0, is imposed on all customers in both sick and healthy states? Again, support your answer graphically.
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- 10. Consider the following figure of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model: Sick ZPL H A ZPL L Healthy a) Is (A, B) a separating or pooling equilibrium? b) Suppose the economy has 90% low risk types and 10% high risk types. Draw the average zero profit line. c) What happens to the contract (A, B)? Explain why.Consider a market for health insurance similar to the one below. Image attached Suppose individuals have different health levels H, where H is distributed uniformly between 0 and 9. The marginal cost of medical care depends on an individual’s health H, and is characterized by the function MC=1000+1000*H (notice that a higher value of H corresponds to a sicker person, with higher marginal costs, so the left edge of the graph corresponds to the sickest person with H=9, and the right edge of the graph corresponds to the healthiest person with H=0). Individuals are risk averse, there is a single insurance plan available for purchase (as in the Akerlof model, NOT the R-S model), and individuals have utility functions for this insurance plan that result in a risk premium equal to RP=1000*H. Now suppose an individual insurance mandate is imposed that forces all consumers to purchase insurance or else pay a tax of $3000. a) What will the insurance mandate do to the equilibrium price of…Suppose that there are two countries, Beta and Gamma. Suppose further that everyone in country Beta is on Insurance B and everyone in country Gamma is on Insurance G. Suppose further that both governments use government-set price controls. In 2005, country Beta decided to change the reimbursement rate for pharmaceuticals, but country Gamma did not make this change. You, a researcher, want to study the effect of offering coverage for this drug had an impact on health expenditures. You have average health expenditures for State Beta and Gamma prior to 2005 and post-2005. Using the information in the table below, a quick difference-in-difference calculation suggests covering this drug ____ health expenditures by approximately ____. State Time Periods Pre-2005 Post-2005 State Beta $1000 $1400 State Gamma $1500 $1700 a. decreased; $400 b. increased; $200 c. increased; $400 d. decreased; $200
- Suppose that there are two countries, Beta and Gamma. Suppose further that everyone in country Beta is on Insurance B and everyone in country Gamma is on Insurance G. Suppose further that both governments use government-set price controls. In 2005, country Beta decided to change the reimbursement rate for pharmaceuticals, but country Gamma did not make this change. You, a researcher, want to study the effect of offering coverage for this drug had an impact on health expenditures. You have average health expenditures for State Beta and Gamma prior to 2005 and post-2005. Using your finding from the question above, you can infer that country Beta likely _____ reimbursement rates for pharmaceutical drugs. State Time Periods Pre-2005 Post-2005 State Beta $1000 $1400 State Gamma $1500 $1700 a. lower b. did not change c. raisedSuppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer10. Consider the following figure of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model: Sick ZPL L ZPL H A B H E Healthy a) Is (A, B) a separating or pooling equilibrium? b) Suppose the economy has 90% low risk types and 10% high risk types. Draw the average zero profit line. c) What happens to the contract (A, B)? Explain why.
- Suppose you have an insurance plan in which you pay the market price for medical care until you meet a deductible of $1,000, after which you have a coinsurance rate of .20. Answer parts a and b assuming your inverse demand curve for medical care is P = 400 – 10Q and the market price for medical care is $200 per unit.a) Graph the price line and your demand curve. On the graph, label the values of the x and y intercepts of the demand curve, the quantity where you meet the deductible, the horizontal sections of the price line, and the point(s) where the demand curve intersects the price line.b) Find the number of units of medical care that you will demand. Show all calculations that youperformed in your analysis.Suppose that there are two countries, Beta and Gamma. Suppose further that everyone in country Beta is on Insurance B and everyone in country Gamma is on Insurance G. Suppose further that both governments use government-set price controls. In 2005, country Beta decided to change the reimbursement rate for pharmaceuticals, but country Gamma did not make this change. You, a researcher. want to study the effect of offering coverage for this drug had an impact on health expenditures. You have average health expenditures for State Beta and Gamma prior to 2005 and post-2005. Using the information in the table below, a quick difference-in-difference calculation suggests covering this drug health expenditures by approximately. Time Periods Pre-2005 Post-2005 $1000 $1400 $1500 $1700 State State Beta State Gamma decreased: $400 increased; $200 decreased: $200 increased; $400Assume throughout that an individual's demand curve for doctors visits is represented by Q = 50 – P. - The market price of a doctor's visit is $30 per visit. Assume the individual has an insurance plan with a deductible of $3,000 and a coinsurance rate of 20%. How many doctor's visits would the individual need have to reach the deductible limit?
- The following is an excerpt from "The Oregon Experiment- Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes," by Baicker et al. (2013). Fill in the blank identifying the method used in this paper given the description in the paragraph (I've given you a hint on the key points by italicizing a few phrases): "Adults randomly selected in the lottery were given the option to apply for Medicaid, but not all persons selected by the lottery enrolled in Medicaid (either because they did not apply or because they were deemed ineligible). Lottery selection increased the probability of Medicaid coverage during our study period by 24.1 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], 22.3 to 25.9; P<0.001). The subgroup of lottery winners who ultimately enrolled in Medicaid was not comparable to the overall group of persons who did not win the lottery. We, therefore, used a standard______ _approach... to estimate the causal effect of enrollment in Medicaid. Intuitively, since the lottery increased the chance…Suppose that Hubert, an economist from an AM talk radio program, and Kate, an economist from a school of industrial relations, are arguing over health insurance. The following dialogue shows an excerpt from their debate: Kate: A popular topic for debate among politicians as well as economists is the idea of providing government assistance for health benefits. Hubert: I think it is oppressive for the government to tax people who take care of themselves in order to pay for health insurance for those who are obese. Kate: I disagree. I think government funding of health insurance is useful to ensure basic fairness. The disagreement between these economists is most likely due to (DIFFERENCE IN SCIENTIFIC JUDGEMENT, DIFFERENCE IN VALUES, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY) . Despite their differences, with which proposition are two economists chosen at random most likely to agree? A. Employers should not be restricted from outsourcing work to foreign nations.…Consider the model of the market for lemons from Chapter 22. Suppose that there are two types of used cars — good ones and lemons — and that sellers know which type of car they have. Buyers do not know which type of car a seller has. The fraction of used cars of each type is 21 and buyers know this. Let’s suppose that a seller who has a good car values it at $10,000 and a seller with a lemon values the lemon at $5,000. A seller is willing to sell his car for any price greater than or equal to his value for the car; the seller is not willing to sell the car at a price below the value of the car. Buyers’ values for good cars and lemons are $14,000 and $8,000, respectively. As in Chapter 22 we will assume that buyers are risk-neutral; that is, they are willing to pay their expected value of a car. (a) Is there an equilibrium in the used-car market in which all types of cars are sold? Briefly explain.(b) Is there an equilibrium in the used-car market in which only lemons are sold? Briefly…