A seller would like to sell a painting using second price (Vickrey) auction. The seller knows that there are three buyers and each buyer is equally likely to have High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) valuation for the painting. The valuations of the buyers are independently distributed. Assuming that the buyers will play the Nash equilibrium in the second price auction, how much revenue will the seller make?

Glencoe Algebra 1, Student Edition, 9780079039897, 0079039898, 2018
18th Edition
ISBN:9780079039897
Author:Carter
Publisher:Carter
Chapter3: Linear And Nonlinear Functions
Section3.7: Piecewise And Step Functions
Problem 30PPS
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A seller would like to sell a painting using second price (Vickrey) auction. The seller knows that there are three buyers and each buyer is equally likely to have High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) valuation for the painting. The valuations of the buyers are independently distributed. Assuming that the buyers will play the Nash equilibrium in the second price auction, how much revenue will the seller make?

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